THE DIAGNOSIS IS ANENCEPHALY AND THE PARENTS ASK ABOUT ORGAN DONATION: NOW WHAT? A GUIDE FOR HOSPITAL COUNSEL AND ETHICS COMMITTEES by Bard, Jennifer S.
Western New England Law Review
Volume 21 21 (1999)
Issue 1 Article 3
1-1-1999
THE DIAGNOSIS IS ANENCEPHALY AND
THE PARENTS ASK ABOUT ORGAN
DONATION: NOW WHAT? A GUIDE FOR
HOSPITAL COUNSEL AND ETHICS
COMMITTEES
Jennifer S. Bard
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.wne.edu/lawreview
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Review & Student Publications at Digital Commons @ Western New England
University School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Western New England Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons
@ Western New England University School of Law. For more information, please contact pnewcombe@law.wne.edu.
Recommended Citation
Jennifer S. Bard, THE DIAGNOSIS IS ANENCEPHALY AND THE PARENTS ASK ABOUT ORGAN DONATION: NOW WHAT?
A GUIDE FOR HOSPITAL COUNSEL AND ETHICS COMMITTEES, 21 W. New Eng. L. Rev. 49 (1999),
http://digitalcommons.law.wne.edu/lawreview/vol21/iss1/3
THE DIAGNOSIS IS ANENCEPHALY AND 

THE PARENTS ASK ABOUT ORGAN 

DONATION: NOW WHAT? A GUIDE 

FOR HOSPITAL COUNSEL AND 

ETHICS COMMITTEES 

JENNIFER S. BARD* 
PROLOGUE: CASE STUDy-THE MSI 
After a period of infertility treatments, Mr. and Mrs. M 
learned that they were going to have triplets. Mrs. M, shortly there­
after, developed a fear that something was wrong with one of the 
babies whom she had named Avery. An ultrasound, at seventeen 
weeks, confirmed Mrs. M's fear. Avery was missing her upper 
skull. She had anencephaly.2 After telling the Ms the result of the 
ultrasound, the maternal-fetal medicine doctor informed the Ms 
* M.P.H, 1997, University of Connecticut; J.D., 1987, Yale Law School, B.A., 
1983, Wellesley College. Much of the research for this Article was done while a visiting 
student at the Hastings Center. Thank you to Dr. Isabella Knox, Dr. David Gregorio, 
Dr. Holger Hansen and Dr. Marilyn Sanders of the University of Connecticut Medical 
School and Leigh Turner and Strachan Donnelley of the Hastings Center for their com­
ments and encouragement on various drafts and sections of this Article. lowe a debt of 
gratitude to the Ms, who shared their daughter with me. This Article is dedicated to Dr. 
Barbara Bard and Eli Bard, my mother and brother, who have given me a lifetime of 
support. It is completed in memory of Victor I. Seidman. 
1. This is a report of a case occurring recently at a university medical center. 
2. An infant with anencephaly is born without those portions of the brain that 
create consciousness. See The Medical Task Force on Anencephaly, The Infant with 
Anencephaly, 322 NEW ENG. J. MED. 669, 669 (1990) [hereinafter Task Force]. The 
defect occurs early in the first month of fetal development when the neural tube, which 
forms the brain, fails to close completely. See id. In common with many medical condi­
tions, there is a range of physical findings that may be labeled anencephaly. This range 
includes infants born without any brain and those infants born without significant por­
tions of their brain. See id. Most infants born with this condition die soon after birth 
since they lack even the autonomic brain stem function that keeps the heart beating. 
See id. at 671. Pictures detailing the condition of anencephaly can be found in Pottor's 
Atlas of Fetal and Infant Pathology. See ENID GILBERT-BARNES, POTTOR'S ATLAS OF 
FETAL AND INFANT PATHOLOGY 246-47 (1998). For more information on anencephaly, 
consult the world wide web; one interesting site is that of the Anencephaly Support 
Foundation. See Anencephaly Support Foundation (visited Apr. 5, 1999) <http:// 
www.asfhelp.com>. 
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about selective reduction.3 He cautioned them, however, that re­
ducing the anencephalic fetus could potentially create a risk of 
aborting the two healthy fetuses. The Ms did not want to take this 
risk. Instead, they tracked Baby Avery's growth throughout the 
pregnancy. 
Soon after learning that Baby Avery was likely to survive birth 
but die shortly thereafter, the Ms thought of organ donation. Mrs. 
M's mother was critically ill with lung disease and was on the wait­
ing list for a lung transplant. Around the same time, Mr. M 
remembered that Mickey Mantle was in the news for receiving a 
liver transplant after only three days on the waiting list. He also 
recalled David Crosby's receipt of a liver transplant. Mrs. M's 
mother, however, did not get a transplant and died before the trip­
lets were born. Mrs. M was too ill to attend the funeral. "We felt," 
said Mr. M, "that she couldn't get [the transplant] because of who 
she was. A regular person had a harder time." 
The Ms raised the issue of organ donation with their obstetri­
cian. Shortly afterward, the obstetrician telephoned the local hospi­
tal's transplant team to refer the Ms. One of the transplant 
coordinators contacted the Ms and was initially positive about the 
possibility of using Baby Avery's heart as a donor organ. The Ms' 
understanding of their conversation with the transplant coordinator 
was that the transplant coordinator "would send a [transplant] team 
over" when the babies were born. "We felt good." Knowing that 
Baby Avery could be an organ donor gave the Ms "a little peace of 
mind." During the pregnancy, Mr. and Mrs. M met a mother whose 
child was in need of a donor heart. While they knew Baby Avery's 
heart would not go to that particular child, it made them feel better 
to believe that a child who needed a heart would benefit from Baby 
Avery's short life. 
Around the same time, the maternal-fetal medicine service 
first informed the neonatology service of the Ms' situation. It was 
the first the neonatologists had heard of the imminent arrival of an 
anencephalic triplet. The neonatologists also learned that the Ms 
wanted Baby Avery to be an organ donor and that the Ms believed 
that the transplant team was offering to harvest the organs as soon 
as the babies were born. 
3. This is a procedure in which a needle is inserted into the heart of a fetus, in this 
case the anencephalic triplet, thus killing it. See Judith F. Darr, Selective Reduction of 
Multiple Pregnancy: Lifeboat Ethics in the Womb, 25 V.C. DAVIS L. REv. 773, 779-80 
(1992). 
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The neonatologists, however, were surprised by this informa­
tion. They discussed the issue of harvesting the organs shortly after 
the babies' birth among themselves and then with the hospital's 
legal counsel; the conclusion was that there was no legal precedent 
for using an anencephalic infant as an organ donor. The neonatolo­
gists also knew, due to a written policy statement, that the consult­
ing neurologist's opinion was that an anencephalic infant was not 
brain dead, and therefore, was not a candidate for organ donation. 
At approximately the same time, the transplant team also began to 
realize that there were serious barriers to harvesting organs from an 
anencephalic infant. According to the Ms, based on the attitude of 
the obstetricians and what they were hearing from the transplant 
team, they began to realize that Baby Avery could not be an organ 
donor. Mrs. M described the obstetrician as "passive" whenever 
the idea was raised. The obstetrician, however, disagreed with this 
perception; he felt that he supported the Ms' decision to donate 
their baby's organs, but that the harvesting could not be done given 
the current state of legal and medical practice. Mrs. M remembers 
specifically, at some point before the birth, being told by the hospi­
tal's transplant team that the team could not do the retrieval. 
Nevertheless, the Ms remained hopeful that something might 
be able to be arranged once the babies were born. At thirty-:.four 
weeks, on November 10, 1995, Mrs. M went to the obstetrician for a 
routine ultrasound. The obstetrician determined that one of the 
two healthy triplets had stopped growing. It was time to deliver the 
babies by caesarean section. Mrs. M's first reaction at hearing that 
she was going to give birth to the triplets was relief. She was very 
uncomfortable with "three sets of arms and legs" pushing against 
her. Almost immediately though, she saddened. "I didn't want 
them to take [the triplets] because it would mean that [Baby Avery] 
would die." 
The neonatologist met the Ms for the first time that afternoon 
and was the first person to tell them definitively that Baby Avery 
could not be an organ donor. The Ms were disappointed. One of 
their first reactions was to ask whether Baby Avery could donate 
organs for the other two triplets if necessary. After explaining that 
the other two triplets would not need organ donations, the Ms were 
again told that Baby Avery could not be an organ donor. Accord­
ing to the neonatologist, the Ms had "been led to believe [organ 
donation] was a possibility when it wasn't." 
Baby Avery was delivered on November 10, 1995, at 7:35 p.m. 
According to the neonatologist, the baby was breathing irregularly 
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on her own at birth. After a few minutes of observation, her 
breathing became regular. She was wrapped in a blanket and taken 
to the nursery. She was kept warm, dry and fed. A hat was put on 
her head. In accordance with her parents' wishes, no tubes, other 
than feeding tubes and intravenous lines, were ever inserted into 
the child. Baby Avery was connected to monitoring equipment. 
The Ms and the neonatologist agreed that Baby Avery would not be 
resuscitated when she began to die. 
According to the Ms, Baby Avery was "perfect from the eye­
brows down." As the ultrasound had revealed, she had no upper 
portion of her skull and her brain stem was visible through the open 
scalp. "They told us she would only live two hours," said Mrs. M, 
but she lived two and one-half days. The Ms spent time, over the 
two day period, holding and photographing Baby Avery. When 
Baby Avery's heart rate began to slow, signifying that she was dy­
ing, she was brought to the Ms, where she was held until she died. 
"I don't know that she didn't feel anything," says Mrs. M. As she 
was dying, "she would cry and her knuckles would tighten." "The 
doctors told me that she didn't feel anything, but I don't believe 
that-how do they know what she's feeling and what she's going 
through." Baby Avery died at 7:35 a.m. on November 13, 1995. 
Both Mr. and Mrs. M feel strongly that Baby Avery should 
have been allowed to donate her organs. Reflecting on that time, 
both Mr. and Mrs. M remarked on Baby Avery's strong and healthy 
heart. "Her heart was very strong-a great heart. Her heart would 
be a great transplant," said Mr. M. "I really wanted this done," 
remembered Mr. M, but "they backed off because of legal issues." 
They said they "couldn't harvest organs from patients who are alive 
... [and] couldn't pronounce [the baby] brain dead." Despite being 
disappointed that Baby Avery could not be an organ donor, the Ms' 
were very pleased with the care they and their babies received at 
the hospital. 
The issues surrounding organ donation by anencephalic infants 
such as Baby Avery are complex for all involved. This Article will 
examine anencephalic organ donation4 by providing an overview of 
the legal, medical, social, and ethical issues that hospital counsel 
4. For an excellent overview of the issues surrounding anencephalic organ dona­
tion, see Calvin R. Stiller et aI., Organ and Tissue Transplants, in 5 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
BIOETHICS 1871, 1871-94 (Warren Thomas Reich ed., revised ed. 1995). For another 
legal discussion of anencephalic organ donation, see Jay A. Friedman, Note, Taking the 
Camel by the Nose: The Anencephalic as a Source for Pediatric Organ Transplants, 90 
COLUM. L. REV. 917 (1990). Although Friedman's article was written prior to legal 
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and ethics committees will face when presented with anencephalic 
organ donation scenarios. This discussion will be framed by re­
counting recent cases involving parents who wanted to donate their 
anencephalic infant's organs. Furthermore, this Article will pro­
pose that the topic of anencephalic organ donation be thoroughly 
discussed and well understood in every medical/legal setting in 
which an anencephalic infant may present itself. Preferably, this 
should happen when there is no case pending so that policies can be 
drafted without the time pressures of a pending case. It is essential 
that transplant teams, organ procurement centers, lawyer-ethicists, 
obstetricians, hospital counsel, maternal-fetal medicine specialists, 
and neonatologists all share a common understanding of 
anencephaly. Once an understanding is shared, parents of an 
anencephalic infant will not be subjected to any greater pain and 
confusion, due to miscommunication, than that which already sur­
rounds the death of their child. 
I. ANENCEPHALY 
A. What Is Anencephaly? 
A diagnosis of anencephaly in an infant, prenatally or at birth, 
is a tragedy for all concerned. Anencephaly.is a birth defect in 
which "(1) [a] large portion of the skull is absent[;] (2) [t]he scalp, 
which extends to the margin of the bone is absent over the skull 
defect[;] (3) [h]emorrhagic, fibrotic tissue is exposed because of de­
fects in the skull and scalp[; or] (4) [r]ecognizable cerebral hemi­
spheres are absent."5 Anencephalic infants lack the brain function 
necessary for maintaining prolonged independent respiration and 
are prone to severe infections from their open heads.6 Further, in­
fants with anencephaly are believed to be permanently uncon­
scious. As one blunt commentator has noted, "[normal brain] 
stems do not differ substantially from the brain stem of a fish, [and 
an anencephalic infant] has more in common with a fish than a per­
son."7 While there are anecdotal reports of survival by 
anencephalic infants for a few days, weeks, or even years, most 
decisions which have affected the law regarding anencephalic infants, it raises and ana­
lyzes several issues that remain important today. 
5. Task Force, supra note 2, at 670. 
6. See id. at 669. 
7. Sabra Chartrand, Legal Definition of Death Is Questioned in Florida Infant 
Case, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 1992, § 1, at 12. While this quotation has made its way into 
the popular lexicon of anencephalic organ donation, its source, Dr. Robert Levine, ex­
plains that he did not intend to compare the baby with a fish. Rather, he was making an 
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anencephalic infants die at, or soon after, birth.8 
B. Anencephaly in the Context of Organ Donation 
For parents, a diagnosis of anencephaly foretells the ultimate 
death of their child. For a medical staff, a diagnosis of anencephaly 
means presiding over an infant's death rather than the beginning of 
a new life. For hospital counsel, a diagnosis of anencephaly triggers 
a number of legal and ethical issues that must be resolved quickly 
and often under great stress. Parents will sometimes, in light of 
publicity about the need for pediatric organ donors, bring up the 
issue of organ donation soon after hearing the diagnosis. This re­
quest will usually trigger an emergency meeting of the hospital's 
ethics committee, which will then have to make a recommendation 
in the face of little or no information.9 
In order to be considered for organ donation, an anencephalic 
infant must be deemed brain dead.1O In the context of anencephaly, 
unfortunately, the brain death standard is often misunderstood by 
counsel advising the ethics committees, by the medical community, 
in general, and by parents who are told on the one hand that their 
baby lacks a brain, but on the other hand that their baby cannot be 
an organ donor due to residual brain function. Counsel must there­
fore have a solid understanding of the legal standards of death in 
order to adequately advise clients in this area. 
A human being must be legally brain dead before becoming an 
observation on brain function. Interview with Robert Levine, M.D., Professor, Yale, 
University, in New Haven, Conn. (Mar. 31, 1999). 
8. See E. Haavi Morreim, Futilitarianism, Exoticare and Coerced Altruism: The 
ADA Meets Its Limits, 25 SETON HALL L. REv. 883, 886 (1995) ("Quantitatively, [treat­
ment] is futile because an anencephalic [infant] will die soon no matter what physicians 
do."). 
9. See generally Robert M. Nelson & Robyn S. Shapiro, The Role of an Ethics 
Committee in Resolving Conflict in the Neonatal Intensive Care Unit, 23 J. L. MED. & 
ETHICS 27 (1995). 
10. Most states use the Uniform Determination of Death Act ("UDDA") to de­
termine whether a person is alive or dead. The UDDA provides the following: 
An individual who has sustained either (1) irreversible cessation of circulatory 
and respiratory functions, or (2) irreversible cessation of all functions of the 
entire brain, including the brain stem, is dead. A determination of death must 
be made in accordance with accepted medical standards. 
UNIF. DETERMINATION OF DEATH Acr § 1, 12A U.L.A. 593 (1996). 
In Washington, D.C., doctors are authorized to extract and preserve organs for 
transplant even before receiving the family's consent. However, such consent must be 
obtained before actual transplantation may occur. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 2.1509.1 
(Supp. 1998); see also Rick Weiss, Demand for Organs Fosters Aggressive Collection 
Methods, WASH. POST, Nov. 24, 1997, at AI. 
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organ donor, except where an organ, such as a kidney, can be 
donated without ending the life of the donor. l1 Since an 
anencephalic infant retains basic brain functions, it cannot meet this 
current standard of brain death.12 Therefore, in almost every case, 
anencephalic organ donation cannot be accomplished.13 The only 
exception is for tissue donation, such as corneas and heart valves, 
which can be harvested after clinical death.14 The solid organs are 
buried with the infant, in essence adding to the shortage of pediatric 
donors and placing tremendous pressure on both families of poten­
tial organ recipients and the medical personnel treating those pa­
tients. Is Despite the small percentage of the potential donor pool 
that they comprise, anencephalic infants draw a fair amount of at­
tention as potential organ donors. 
The issue of anencephalic organ donation is hotly debated and 
has generated significant comment from doctors, lawyers, and 
ethicists.16 A leading article in the Journal o/the American Medical 
Association in 1989, authored in part by Alexander Capron and 
Alan Shewmon, provided the seminal analysis of public health, 
legal, medical, and ethical issues raised by anencephalic organ do­
nationP The article predicted that anencephalic infants would 
never be a significant source of donor organs due to ethical and 
legal difficulties.18 Ten years later, many of the article's predictions 
about attempts to use anencephalic infants as organ donors have 
proven accurate. Most notably, major advances in prenatal diagno­
sis have dramatically reduced the number of potential anencephalic 
organ donors, thereby strengthening the contention that the actual 
number of such organs available is so small that anencephalic in­
fants cannot provide a realistic answer to the critical shortage of 
11. For a discussion of the determination of whether a person is alive or dead, see 
supra note 10. 
12. See Norman Fost, Removing Organs from Anencephalic Infants: Ethical and 
Legal Considerations, 16 CLINICS IN PERlNATOLOGY 331, 333 (1989). 
13. See Task Force, supra note 2, at 671. 
14. See Rene Lafreniere & Mary H. McGrath, End of Life Issues; Anencephalic 
Infants as Organ Donors, 1998 J. AM. C. SURGEONS 443, 445. 
15. See generally Kathleen L. Paliokas, Anencephalic Newborns as Organ Do­
nors: An Assessment of "Death" and Legislative Policy, 31 WM. & MARY L. REv. 197 
(1989). 
16. See, e.g., D. Alan Shewmon et aI., The Use ofAnencephalic Infants as Organ 
Sources, 261 JAMA 1773 (1989); George J. Annas, From Canada with Love: 
Anencephalic Newborns as Organ Donors, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Dec. 1987, at 36. 
17. See Shewmon et aI., supra note 16. 
18. See id. at 1780. 
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infant donor organs.19 Nonetheless, the issues raised by 
anencephalic organ donation remain important in light of present 
day attempts to increase the pool of potential organ donors by in­
cluding those without a functioning consciousness, such as people in 
permanent vegetative states. 
II. THE ORGAN DONATION SYSTEM 
Organ donation in the United States is highly regulated by 
state and federal laws. The federal government regulates organ do­
nation through the National Organ Transplant Act ("NOTA").20 In 
addition, every state has enacted the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act 
("UAGA"),21 which grants individuals and, after death, their family 
members the right to decide whether or not to donate organs.22 
Under both the federal and state laws, it is a crime for any person 
to pay money for an organ.23 Thus, a person in need of an organ 
transplant must. rely on a volunteer donor rather than personal ac­
quisition of an organ; unfortunately, the system of matching recipi­
ents with volunteer donors is very complex.24 
19. The number of anencephalic babies born has dropped steadily since the 
1960's. See id. at 1774. The sharp decline in the number of reported births of 
anencephalic infants, along with the growing, almost universal practice of screening 
every pregnancy with ultrasound, has made it interesting to revisit Capron and 
Shewmon's analysis of how many organs would actually be available for donation by 
anencephalic infants. See id. at 1774-75. 
Assuming 4 million live births a year, rather than the 3.5 million used by Shewmon 
and Capron in 1989, and 0.3 cases of anencephaly per 1000 births, there should be 1200 
potential organ donors born in the United States every year. See id. at 1774. Approxi­
mately 20% of pregnancies are screened for neural tube defects during the second tri­
mester, see id., resulting in 240 cases detected. Approximately 95% of these 
pregnancies are likely to be terminated, see id., making the number of anencephalic 
births around 970 per year. Shewmon and Capron estimate that 66% of anencephalic 
infants are still born, see id., reducing the total live births to 330. Of these, Shewmon 
and Capron estimate that 60% are too small to serve as organ donors, leaving 132 in­
fants. If, again as Shewmon and Capron estimate, two thirds of the parents are willing 
to use their infants as donors, see id., there would be 87 donors. These 87 potential 
donors are not sufficient to meet the need for pediatric organs. 
This update of Shewmon and Capron's analysis only strengthens their point that 
the available pool of anencephalic infants is too small to be a significant factor in in­
creasing organ availability. See id. at 1774-75, 1780. 
20. See 42 U.S.c. §§ 273-274e (1994). 
21. See UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT, 8A U.L.A. 19 (1993). 
22. See UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 3, 8A U.L.A. 40 (1993). 
23. See 42 U.S.C. § 274e; UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 15, 8A u.L.A. 62 
(1993). 
24. Organ transplantations are administered in hospitals by organ procurement 
teams which operate under United Network for Organ Sharing ("UNOS") guidelines to 
harvest organs and make them available to patients in need. The organ procurement 
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Perhaps the greatest issue currently facing pediatric transplan­
tation is that of organ supply. For some children, especially infants 
with heart conditions, a transplant is their only chance for long term 
survival.25 In fact, the single most needed organs for children are 
hearts and, to some extent, livers.26 Moreover, the scarcity of pedi­
atric organs creates intense demand. Thus, the issue of pediatric 
organ donation has become a major public health concern.27 Nu­
merous plans and proposals to increase the availability of pediatric 
organ donors have been brought forward, including proposals to 
increase the supply of organs from humans,28 animals,29 and 
anencephalic infants.3o 
team may already be involved by the time the issue of organ donation reaches counsel, 
as was the case with Baby Avery. Counsel should not rely on the organ procurement 
team to manage the issue. The question of anencephalic organ donation may never 
have occurred at the particular medical center. Even in centers with policies governing 
anencephalic organ donation, the organ procurement team can, as was the case with 
Baby Avery, unreasonably raise expectations by failing to adequately explain the issue 
of brain death. 
25. These infants are particularly good candidates for transplant since they are 
usually healthy in every way except for their heart defect. Moreover, since infants are 
much less likely to reject a heart than adults, transplantation is a "rational, durable 
therapy" for hypoplastic left heart syndrome. Howard P. Gurgesell & Thomas A. Mas­
saro, Management of Hypoplastic Left Heart Syndrome in a Consortium of University 
Hospitals, 76 AM. J. CARDIOLOGY 809, 810 (1995); see also Leonard L. Bailey et ai., 
Bless the Babies: One Hundred Fifteen Late Survivors of Heart Transplantation During 
the First Year of Life, 105 J. THORACIC & CARDIOVASCULAR SURGERY 805 (1993). 
26. See Ingrid Kinkopf-Zajac, Assessing Patient Compliance in the Selection of 
Organ Transplant Recipients, 6 HEALTH MATRIX 503, 521-23 (1996) (explaining that 
livers and hearts are especially needed for transplants because patients in need of these 
organs will die if denied an organ, unlike an organ such as a kidney for which there are 
alternative methods to sustain life other than an organ transplant). 
27. While there is no formal cost-benefit analysis of infant organ transplantation, 
one leading commentator recently noted that "the cost of many other forms of medical 
care is on a par with transplantation." Arthur L. Caplan, Current Ethical Issues in Or­
gan Procurement and Transplantation, 272 JAMA 1708, 1708-09 (1994). 
28. One of the most extreme proposals for increasing the availability of organs is 
an "organ draft [which] would empower the state to conscript every cadaveric organ 
suitable for transplantation without regard to any contrary wishes expressed by the de­
cedent while he lived or by surviving relatives after he dies." Theodore Silver, The Case 
for a Post-Mortem Organ Draft and a Proposed Model Organ Draft Act, 68 B.U. L. 
REv. 681, 681 (1988). Another suggestion is to pay families to release their relative's 
organs for donations. See Developments in the Law-Medical Technology and the Law, 
103 HARV. L. REv. 1519, 1623-29 (1990). 
29. See generally Charles R. McCarthy, Bioethics Inside the Beltway: A New Look 
at Animal-to-Human Organ Transplantation, 6 KENNEDY INsT. ETHICS J. 183 (1996). 
30. See, e.g., Beth Brandon, Note, Anencephalic Infants as Organ Donors: A 
Question of Life or Death, 40 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 781 (1989-90); Friedman, supra 
note 4; Andrea K. Scott, Note, Death Unto Life: Anencephalic Infants as Organ Donors, 
74 VA. L. REv. 1527 (1988). 
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III. ORGAN DONATION BY ANENCEPHALIC INFANTS 
A. A Court's Analysis: The Baby Theresa Case ' 
The issues surrounding the use of anencephalic infants as organ 
donors was the topic of much debate, but very little legal guidance, 
until the case of Theresa Ann Campo Pearson ("Baby Theresa") 
arose in Florida.31 In 1992, with the birth of Baby Theresa, the le­
gality of anencephalic organ donation was tested for the first time 
in United States' courts.32 Baby Theresa was diagnosed prenatally 
with anencephaly and her mother agreed to a caesarean section 
"with the express hope that the infant's organs would be less dam­
aged and could be used for transplant in other sick children. "33 
Baby Theresa's birth sparked an intense debate in the legal commu­
nity regarding the legal restrictions on organ donation.34 
A fundamental legal principle of organ donation requires the 
donor, or his family, to consent to the donation.35 While no specific 
law requires that organ donation be undertaken voluntarily, the for­
cible invasion of a person's bodily integrity to obtain an organ is a 
crime just like any other assault.36 When the prospective donor is a 
minor, the process is even more highly regulated, with great care 
taken to avoid exploitation.37 The events of Baby Theresa's life are 
well known. The child's parents were told in the eighth month of 
pregnancy that their daughter was anencephalic and would either 
be born dead or live for just a few minutes.38 The doctors suggested 
31. See In re T.A.C.P., 609 So. 2d 588 (Fla. 1992). See generally J. Steven Justice, 
Casenote, Personhood and Death-the Proper Treatment of Anencephalic Organ Do· 
nors Under the Law: In Re T.A.C.P., 609 So. 2d 588 (Fla. 1992), 62 U. CIN. L. REv. 1227 
(1994). 
32. See Joseph M. Healey, Ends and Means in Organ Transplantation: The 
Anencephalic Donor, 57 CONN. MED. 49, 49-50 (1993). 
33. T.A.C.P., 609 So. 2d at 589. 
34. See, e.g., Daniel Avila, Medical Treatment Rights ofOlder Persons and Persons 
with Disabilities: 1992-93 Developments and Emerging Trends, 9 ISSUES L. & MED. 345 
(1994); Lisa E. Hanger, The Legal, Ethical and Medical Objections to Procuring Organs 
from Anencephalic Infants, 5 HEALTH MATRIX 347 (1995); Justice, supra note 31; David 
T. McDowell, Note, Death ofan Idea: The Anencephalic as an Organ Donor, 72 TEX. L. 
REv. 893 (1994). 
35. See UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFr ACT § 3, 8A U.L.A. 40 (1993). 
36. See Strachan v. John F. Kennedy Mem'l Hosp., 638 A.2d 346 (N.J. 1988); see 
also Kevin P. Quinn, Comment, The Best Interests of Incompetent Patients: The Capac­
ity for Interpersonal Relationships as a Standard for Decisionmaking, 76 CAL. L. REv. 
897 (1988) (describing the common law right to freedom from nonconsensual invasions 
of bodily integrity and the federal constitutional right to privacy). 
37. See ANGELA RODDEY HOLDER, LEGAL ISSUES IN PEDIATRICS AND ADOLES­
CENT MEDICINE 167-72 (2d ed. 1985). 
38. See T.A.c.P., 609 So. 2d at 589. 
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a third-trimester abortion, but also explained that the baby would 
be a candidate for organ donation if she were carried to term.39 
Theresa's parents decided not to pursue an abortion but in­
stead to, donate her organs.40 For a short period after birth, the 
baby was placed on a mechanical ventilator as a precautionary mea­
sure.41 However, Baby Theresa continued to breath after she was 
removed from life support; thus, she became ineligible to be de­
clared dead under an applicable Florida statute.42 Faced with this 
change in circumstances, the hospital refused to consider the child 
as an organ donor "out of concern that [it] might incur civil or crim­
inal liability."43 The hospital's action triggered a legal petition by 
the parents which sought to declare Theresa dead so that her organs 
could be donated.44 
The trial court held that, under Florida law, Baby Theresa was 
ineligible to be declared dead since she was surviving without life 
support and her brain stem continued to function.45 Theresa's par­
ents appealed; the Florida District Court of Appeal for the Fourth 
District "summarily affirmed but then certified the trial court's or­
der to [the Florida Supreme Court] for immediate resolution of the 
issue."46 Although Baby Theresa died during the pendency of the 
appeal,47 the Florida Supreme Court agreed to decide the case in 
order to establish a legal precedent.48 In In re T.A.C.P,49 the court 
recognized Theresa's parents' intent in pursuing the action by stat­
ing "[w]e have been deeply touched by the altruism and unques­
tioned motives of the parents of [Baby Theresa]. The parents have 
shown great humanity, compassion, and concern for others."5o The 
court also recognized the pressing need for organ donors, writing 
39. See id.; see also Frank A. Chervenak et aI., When Is Termination ofPregnancy 
During the Third Trimester Morally Justifiable?, 310 NEW ENG. J. MED. 501, 501-03 
(1984) (explaining the process of third trimester abortions). 
40. See T.A.C.P., 609 So. 2d at 589. The baby was delivered by cesarean section 
on March 21, 1991, to reduce trauma to the organs. See id. 
41. See id. 
42. The court stated that "the evidence shows that [Baby Theresa's] heart was 
beating and she was breathing at the times in question. Accordingly, she was not dead 
under Florida law, and no donation of her organs would have been legal." Id. at 595. 
43. Id. at 589. 
44. See id. 
45. See id. 
46. Id. 
47. See id. at 589 n.2. 
48. See id. at 589. 
49. 609 So. 2d 588 (Fla. 1992). 
50. Id. at 594. 
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"[t]here is no doubt that a need exists for infant organs for 
transplantation. Nationally, between thirty and fifty percent of chil­
dren under two years of age who need transplants die while waiting 
for organs to become available."51 
The court then analyzed common law and statutory law and 
found that, under common law, a person is viewed as being dead 
when he can no longer breath and his blood stops circulating. 52 
Considering rapid advances in medical technology, most states have 
adopted the Uniform Determination of Death Act.53 Florida, how­
ever, as recognized by the court, enacted a statute that requires 
"irreversible cessation of the functioning of the entire brain, includ­
ing the brain stem" before a person may be viewed as dead.54 
The Florida Supreme Court, in T.A. c.P., concluded that the 
Florida statute applied to persons on life support only.55 At the 
time her parents brought the petition, Baby Theresa was breathing 
on her own without the need for life support. Thus, the court con­
cluded that "[t]he evidence shows that [Baby Theresa's] heart was 
beating and she was breathing at the times in question. Accord­
ingly, she was not dead under Florida law, and no donation of her 
organs would have been legal."56 Importantly, the court decided 
not to read an exception for anencephalic infants into the law, not­
ing that "the 1988 Florida Legislature considered a bill that would 
have defined 'death' to include anencephaly" but rejected it.57 
51. Id. at 591 (citing Joyce L. Peabody et aI., Experience with Anencephalic In­
fants as Prospective Organ Donors, 321 NEW ENG. J. MIlD. 344, 344 (1989». 
52. See id. at 591-93. 
53. UNIF. DETERMINATION OF DEAlE Acr, 12A U.L.A. 589 (1996). The 
T.A.C.P. court recognized the existence of the Uniform Act and quoted its language: 
"An individual who has sustained either (1) irreversible cessation of circulatory and 
respiratory functions, or (2) irreversible cessation of all functions of the entire brain, 
including the brain stem, is dead. A determination of death must be made in accord­
ance with accepted medical standards." T.A.C.P., 609 So. 2d at 592 (quoting UNIF. 
DETERMINATION OF DEAlE Acr § 1, 12 U.L.A. 340 (Supp. 1991». 
54. T.A.c.P., 609 So. 2d at 592. The entire statutory section reads as follows: 
For legal and medical purposes, where respiratory and circulatory functions 
are maintained by artificial means of support so as to preclude a determination 
that these functions have ceased, the occurrence of death may be determined 
where there is the irreversible cessation of the functioning of the entire brain, 
including the brain stem, determined in accordance with this section. 
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 382.009(1) (West 1998). A later subsection explains further that 
"[e]xcept for a diagnosis of brain death, the standard set forth in this section is not the 
exclusive standard for determining death or for the withdrawal of life support systems." 
Id. § 382.009(4). 
55. See T.A. c.P., 609 So. 2d at 592. 
56. Id. at 595. 
57. /d. at 593. The court noted the following: "The bill died in committee. While 
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B. The Rise of Organ Donation by Anencephalic Infants 
Some critics of anencephalic organ donation might question 
the technical feasibility of such transplants. As medical technology 
has advanced, however, it has become increasingly possible to sup­
port organs by keeping anencephalic infants oxygenated through 
mechanical life support.58 Furthermore, medical literature indi­
cates that transplanting organs from anencephalic infants is possi­
ble.59 This technical feasibility, combined with the possibility of 
preserving the anencephalic infant's visceral organ functions when 
born, and the inevitability of the anencephalic infant's death, has 
led physicians to view these infants as potential organ donors.6o 
Viewing anencephalic infants as potential organ donors has brought 
on great debate and angry protest from many organizations.61 
The issue of anencephalic organ donation reached widespread 
public attention for the first time in 1968, when one of the first suc­
cessful heart transplants was performed using an anencephalic in­
fant as a donor.62 After this success, programs for harvesting 
organs from anencephalic infants became widespread, especially 
outside of the United States. There were reports during the late 
the failure of legislation in committees does not establish legislative intent, it neverthe­
less supports the conclusion that as recently as 1988 no consensus existed among Flor­
ida's lawmakers regarding the issue we confront today." Id. 
58. Since the mother's "life support system" supports the fetus' growth in the 
womb, anencephalic infants who survive to term frequently, but do not always, do so 
with all of their internal organs intact and well formed. What goes wrong, in basic 
terms, is that there is no brain or nervous system to take over at birth. In every case of 
true anencephaly, the baby lacks the parts of the brain that regulate "consciousness, 
thought, memory and feeling." Scott, supra note 30, at 1527 n.4. 
59. See Task Force, supra note 2, at 672. There are some restrictions, however, on 
the use of an anencephalic's organs for transplantation. First, anencephalic infants are 
often premature and weigh less than 2,000 grams. See id. This can result in organs too 
small to be of use. See id. Also, in some cases anencephaly is associated with other 
birth defects which affect the organs. See id. 
60. In fact, there have been reported cases of anencephalic organ transplantation 
in the United States. George Annas reports that the first human to human transplant in 
the United States was done in 1968 by Adrian Kantrowitz, and actually involved an 
anencephalic infant as a donor. See Annas, supra note 16, at 37. 
61. The following organizations filed amicus briefs opposing the use of Baby The­
resa's organs in the T.A.c.P. case: Americans United for Life and Florida Right to 
Life; the American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of Florida, Inc.; the Arc, Ethics 
and Advocacy Task Force of the Nursing Home Action Group; the United Network for 
Organ Sharing; and the Advocacy Center for Persons with Disabilities, Inc. See 
T.A.C.P., 609 So. 2d at 588. See Shewmon et aI., supra note 16, for a further discussion 
of this opposition. 
62. See supra note 60 for a brief discussion of this transplant. 
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1980's of kidney transplants from West Germany63 and Spain.64 
C. 	 The Medical Community's Response to Using Anencephalic 
Infants as Organ Donors 
In December of 1994, the Council on Ethical and Iudicial Af­
fairs ("CEIA") reversed their long standing position that an 
anencephalic infant must be declared dead in order to be treated as 
an organ donor.65 CEIA is a subdivision of the American Medical 
Association ("AMA"), which interprets the principles of medical 
ethics for the AMA.66 Rather than require an anencephalic infant 
to be declared dead before organ donation, as the AMA had done 
in the past, CEIA's 1994 opinion provided that organs could be ob­
tained from a still living anencephalic infant.67 CEIA supported 
this position by reasoning that anencephalics have no consciousness 
and therefore do not have the rights of human beings.68 The AMA 
adopted the opinion and it was, for a short time, the official position 
of the AMA that organs could be harvested from a living 
anencephalic infant.69 A public and professional outcry followed 
this announcement.70 Physicians, parents of handicapped infants, 
and clergymen were all opposed to the new position.71 Reacting to 
the protest, the AMA took the unusual action of having a public 
hearing on the issue.72 Based on the results of that hearing, CEIA 
suspended its position, thus returning to the position that the AMA 
had held since 1982: an anencephalic infant must be declared dead 
in order to be treated as an organ donor.73 
The AMA's retreat reflected the feelings of a substantial 
number of physicians who were not comfortable with . using 
anencephalic neonates as organ donors. This decision was based on 
63. See generally Wolfgang Holzgreve et aI., Kidney Transplantation from 
Anencephalic Donors, 316 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1069 (1987). 
64. See generally F.J. Gomez-Campdera et aI., Kidney Transplantation from 
Anencephalic Donors, 10 CHILD NEPHROLOGY & UROLOGY 143 (1990). 
65. See James Walters et aI., Anencephaly: Where Do We Now Stand?, 17 SEMI· 
NARS IN NEUROLOGY 249, 250-57 (1997). 
66. 	 See id. at 249-50. 
67. 	 See id. at 250-51. 
68. See id. at 251 (quoting Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, The Use of 
Anencephalic Neonates as Organ Donors, 273 JAMA 1614, 1615 (1995) [hereinafter 
CEJA]). 
69. 	 See id. 
70. 	 See id. 
71. 	 See id. 
72. 	 See id. 
73. 	 See id. 
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"reports from the scientific community that question[ ed] the as­
sumption that all infants with anencephaly lack consciousness."74 It 
is therefore arguable that the AMA implicitly retained the position 
that an anencephalic infant that lacks consciousness can be consid­
ered as an organ donor, even if the infant does not meet the legal 
standards of death.75 
IV. SOCIAL CONSIDERATIONS IMPACrING ORGAN DONATION BY 
ANENCEPHALIC INFANTS 
There are a number of social concerns surrounding 
anencephalic organ donation. Many groups, such as pediatricians, 
parents of anencephalic infants, parents of children in need of or­
gans, and political issue groups that oppose any taking of human 
life, frequently express their opinions on this issue. In fact, the 
AMA's decision to suspend its policy on anencephalic organ dona­
tion was spurred by protest from the medical community.76 The 
protest included activities by anti-abortion groups, such as the Na­
tional Right to Life Committee ("NRLC"), which views 
anencephalic infants as alive because they are born with a brain 
stem.?7 Since, the NRLC is committed to preserving life in all of its 
forms, including that of the fetus, it opposes using the anencephalic 
infant as an organ donor.?8 . 
Another group that opposes declaring anencephalic infants 
dead for the purpose of organ donation is the Advocacy Center for' 
Persons with Disabilities, Inc. ("ACPD"), which protects and advo­
74. Diane M. Gianelli, Ethics Council Reverses Stand on Anencephalic Organ Do­
nors, AM. MED. NEWS, Dec. 25, 1995, at 3. 
75. See generally Walters et aI., supra note 65, at 250-57. With the withdrawal of 
the December 1994 position, the AMA's position on anencephalic infants as organ do­
nors is that: 
Physicians may provide anencephalic infants with ventilator assistance and 
other medical therapies that are necessary to sustain organ perfusion and via­
bility until such time as a determination of death can be made in accordance 
with accepted medical standards and relevant law. Retrieval and transplanta­
tion of the organs of anencephalic infants are ethically permissible only after 
such determination of death is made, and only in accordance with the Coun­
cil's guidelines for the transplantation. 
Charles W. Plows, The Use of Anencephalic Neonates as Organ Donors-Reconsidera­
tion, in CoUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS, PROCEEDINGS OF THE HOUSE 
OF DELEGATES OF THE AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, 49TH INTERIM MEETING 
225, 225 (1995). 
76. See supra Part III.C for a discussion of the AMA's response to such protest. 
77.. See Walters et aI., supra note 65, at 251; see also Scott, supra note 30, at 1555­
58 (explaining the views of NRLC in general). 
78. See Scott, supra note 30, at 1555. 
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cates for persons with disabilities. The ACPD is concerned about 
the fate of anencephalic infants because of its mission to advocate 
for those members of society who must struggle daily against those 
who would classify them unfairly.79 Relaxing the "whole brain 
death" criteria for anencephaly may lead to relaxing the criteria for 
other persons with disabilities, for example, those with 
hydrencephaly or microencephaly.8o Finally, there is substantial 
opposition to anencephalic organ donation by neurologists and pe­
diatricians who argue that any person with a brain stem is alive and 
therefore cannot be a source of donor organs.81 
V. LEGAL ISSUES SURROUNDING ORGAN DONATION BY 
. ANENCEPHALIC INFANTS 
A. The Parental Right to Withhold Treatment 
Hospital counsel and ethics committees must consider whether 
parents have a right to withhold treatment from their anencephalic 
infant. Generally speaking, parents have a right to withhold treat­
ment from their children.82 In fact, parents have a constitutional 
right to make several decisions for their children.83 However, when 
the patient is a newborn infant, statutes often limit the choices 
79. See supra note 61 (explaining that the ACPD filed an amicus brief in the 
T.A.c.P. case). See generally Krischer v. Mciver, 697 So. 2d 97, 101-02 (briefly explain­
ing the views of the ACPD). 
80. One advocate for the disabled has written the following: 
Children born with disabilities deserve the same respect and honor as able­
bodied infants. Somehow, in the quest for medical breakthroughs, we have 
forgotten what is decent and fair. The issue is not what will make parents feel 
better or meet the needs of others but what is right for this child! It doesn't 
matter if a baby has 6 seconds or 60 years to live. What does matter is that any 
child born with a disability has value and deserves to be recognized as such. 
Brenda Bondurant, Babies and Organs, VIRGINIA-PILOT, July 27, 1995, at A12. See 
supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text for a discussion of the "whole brain death" 
standard. 
81. As one neurologist interested in the issue of anencephalic organ donation ex­
plains, neurologists are "the keepers of the holy grail" in deciding who is alive and who 
is not. "Our job," she explains, is "to keep things clear," not to be swayed by the good 
it might do for others if a baby is declared dead. Referring to the slippery slope, the 
doctor explained that as far as brain function is concerned, anencephalic infants are in 
exactly the same situation as people in permanent vegetative states: both lack all but 
brain stem function. Nevertheless, there is no movement to declare persons in a perma­
nent vegetative state dead for any reason, including the taking of organs. Interview 
with Carol Leicher, M.D., Associate Professor of Pediatrics and Neurology, University 
of Connecticut School of Medicine, in Hartford, Conn. (June 30, 1996). 
82. See In re L.H.R., 221 S.E.2d 716, 722 (Ga. 1984) (allowing the withholding of 
treatment from a patient in a chronic vegetative state). 
83. See generally Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (allowing Amish par­
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available to parents. For example, the Child Abuse Prevention and 
Treatment and Adoption Reform statutes, commonly referred to as 
the Baby Doe statutes, provide that doctors and parents are prohib­
ited from subjecting an infant to medical neglect.84 The Baby Doe 
statutes provide that treatment can be withheld from an infant with 
a life threatening condition only under a set of very specific circum­
stances. Treatment need not be offered when: 
(A) the infant is chronically and irreversibly comatose; 
(B) the provision of such treatment would (i) merely prolong dy­
ing, (ii) not be effective in ameliorating or correcting all of the 
infant's life threatening conditions, or (iii) otherwise be futile in 
terms of the survival of the infant; or 
(C) the provision of such treatment would be virtually futile in 
terms of the survival of the infant and the treatment itself under 
such circumstances would be inhumane.85 
Application of the Baby Doe statutes to anencephalic infants is 
quite complicated. The term "futile" is legally and medically am­
biguous. What, for example, is the time frame of the futility? Min­
utes, days, or years? Looking at another aspect of the statute, 
counsel may wonder what would constitute inhumane treatment of 
an infant if it cannot suffer.86 Are we sure that anencephalic infants 
do not suffer? The question remains, do the parents of an 
ents to ignore a compulsory school attendance law due to its conflict with the parents' 
fundamental right to guide their children's religious beliefs). 
84. See generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101-5107, 5111-5119c (1994 & Supp. II 1996). 
85. [d. § 5106g (emphasis added). 
86. The philosopher Hans Jonas disagrees with an interpretation of the Baby Doe 
statutes which concludes that an infant who cannot feel does not have to be treated 
humanely. There is an obligation we all have to treat living creatures with respect, 
regardless of their ability to process or understand pain. See infra Part VI.E for a dis­
cussion of the views of Hans Jonas. ' 
Until quite recently, no infant was given anesthesia before surgery because current 
medical wisdom held that their brains, though intact, were not developed sufficiently to 
experience pain. This has been roundly disproved. The case of anencephalic infants 
not feeling pain seems stronger since these infants lack the higher brain function cur­
rently believed to be necessary to perceive pain. The issue of pain and suffering coats 
the surface of the larger issue of whether these anencephalic infants are human, and 
therefore entitled to basic human rights. Would it, for example, be appropriate to use 
an anencephalic infant for vivisection? The AMA seems to be dangerously close to 
asking this question in their effort to determine definitively if anencephalic infants feel. 
It is this author's opinion that whether these infants feel or not, they are human and 
entitled to full human rights. Viewed in this light, an anencephalic infant has the same 
rights as any human to forego medical treatment when that treatment would not result 
in a clear, long-term benefit. 
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anencephalic infant have the right to refuse treatment? The answer 
would appear to be yes. 
Parents arguably have a right to refuse treatment for their 
anencephalic infant as analogous case law already supports this 
proposition.87 There has been, however, no legal case questioning a 
parent's decision to withhold or withdraw life saving technology 
from an anencephalic infant. Given the strong consensus in the 
medical community that anencephaly is a condition incompatible 
with life,88 it is unlikely that an interloper could, through the legal 
system, force parents to treat an anencephalic infant. 
The Baby Doe statutes state explicitly that treatment is not re­
quired when the infant is permanently unconscious. This overriding 
principle cuts through the haze of futility and suffering to arrive at 
the core issue that these infants lack the brain tissue necessary for 
consciousness. Still, hospitals must determine whether they them­
selves have an obligation to treat an anencephalic infant. 
B. The Hospital's Obligation to Treat: Baby K's Case 
In 1992, a child, known to the courts as Baby K, was diagnosed 
prenatally with anencephaly.89 Baby K's mother did not want to 
abort; rather, she wanted to continue with the pregnancy.90 As 
soon as she was born, Baby K began having difficulty breathing and 
was placed on life support equipment.91 The physicians made a de­
finitive diagnosis of anencephaly and recommended that the sup­
port be removed and a "Do Not Resuscitate" ("DNR") order be 
entered.92 Baby K's mother refused.93 This refusal set in motion a 
series of events that culminated in two well-publicized court deci­
sions, one in the United States District Court for the Eastern Dis­
trict of Virginia94 and one in the United States Court of Appeals for 
87. This prediction is based on the case law allowing parents to refuse conven­
tional treatment for their child so long as the conventional treatment has a very low 
probability of success. See, e.g., In re Hofbauer, 398 N.E.2d 1009 (N.Y. 1979) (allowing 
parents to treat cancer in their child with nutritional or metabolic therapy based on the 
recommendation of a licensed physician that it was a valid therapy despite contrary 
arguments that it was not the most often used therapy). 
88. See Task Force, supra note 2, at 671. 
89. See In re Baby K, 832 F. Supp. 1022, 1025 (E.D. Va. 1993), affd, 16 F.3d 590 
(4th Cir. 1994). 
90. See id. 
91. See id. 
92. See id. 
93. See id. 
94. In re Baby K, 832 F. Supp. 1022 (E.D. Va. 1993), affd, 16 F.3d 590 (4th Cir. 
1994). 
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the Fourth Circuit.95 
The treating physicians eventually took the matter to the hos­
pital's ethics committee, which decided that a DNR order was ap­
propriate.96 The baby's mother, however, known to the court as 
Ms. H, disagreed with the ethics committee and arranged to have 
Baby K transferred to a nursing home with the understanding that 
if she were again in respiratory distress, the hospital would readmit 
her.97 Over the next two and one-half years, Baby K returned to 
the hospital several times for resuscitation and respiratory sup­
port.98 The hospital and its medical staff were being asked to do far 
more than "allow" the baby to live; they were being asked to do all 
that was medically possible to keep her alive. Finally, the hospital, 
joined by the baby's father and a court appointed guardian for 
Baby K, sought a declaratory judgment to cease ventilator treat­
ment in the case of future respiratory distress.99 
The district court refused to issue a declaratory order and 
found instead that removal of life support would violate specific 
provisions of three different Acts: the Emergency Treatment and 
Active Labor Act ("EMTALA"), the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 
and the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA").100 The Fourth 
Circuit, considering only EMTALA, upheld the district court's rul­
ing that the hospital's withdrawal of life support would violate the 
statute.101 The court noted that EMTALA requires a hospital to 
either stabilize or transfer any patient.102 The court stated that "the 
hospital must provide that treatment necessary to prevent the mate­
rial deterioration of [each patient's medical] condition," regardless 
95. In re Baby "K", 16 F.3d 590 (4th Cir. 1994). 
96. See Baby K, 832 F. Supp. at 1025. 
97. See id. 
98. See id. at 1025-26. One interesting discussion of the Baby K case considers 
the ethical issues her care raised with the nursing staff. Many of the nurses caring for 
her felt that she had no viable quality of life and that it was therefore immoral to keep 
her alive. For example, "[i]n an average week, this child would be suctioned over 200 
times, receive trach care 21 times, have blood drawn at least 2 times, and be manipu­
lated in some other way to receive care 300 times or more." Cindy Hylton Rushton, 
The Baby K Case: Ethical Challenges ofPreserving Professional Integrity, 21 PEDIATRIC 
NURSING 367, 368 (1995). 
99. See Baby K, 832 F. Supp. at 1026. 
100. See id. at 1026-29; see also Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor 
Act, 42 U.S.c. § 1395dd (1994); Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.c. §§ 701-797b 
(1994 & Supp. II 1996); Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101­
12213 (1994 & Supp. II 1996). 
101. See In re Baby "K", 16 F.3d 590, 598 (4th Cir. 1994). 
102. See id. at 594. 
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of the long term prognosis of the patient.103 The Fourth Circuit did 
not discuss the other statutes. Ultimately, the United States 
Supreme Court declined to hear the case, thus making the Fourth 
Circuit decision fina1. 104 
The Baby K case did not directly concern organ donation, but 
it may be crucial to an understanding of the outer boundaries of 
parents' rights regarding the treatment of anencephalic infants. 
Although the decisions did not discuss the issue of organ donation, 
it is arguable that the issue falls within the courts' decisions. How­
ever, a recent analysis of the Baby K decisions, as they relate to 
anencephalic organ donation, concludes that neither the legal deci­
sions, nor the statutes consider~d by the courts have any bearing on 
parental decisions to donate the organs of an anencephalic in­
fant.105 Instead, the case focused on a hospital's duty to treat an 
anencephalic infant at the parent's insistence. Thus, the case is rele­
vant only to resolving issues regarding the duties of a hospital to 
administer care at the insistence of an outside party, rather than the 
issue of ceasing such care for purposes of organ donation. For in­
stance, within the scope of the Baby K decisions, there may be an 
issue as to whether third parties can force a hospital to treat an 
anencephalic infant despite a decision by the baby's parents not to 
treat that infant. 
The district court, in Baby K, undertook a careful and cogent 
constitutional analysis of the matter. It found that a parent has a 
due process right under the United States Constitution to raise a 
child as he or she wishes.106 This right extends to parentaP07 deci­
103. Id. 
104. However, Judge Sprouse, dissenting from the Fourth Circuit Majority Opin­
ion, wrote the following: "In my view, Congress, even in its weakest moments, would 
not have attempted to impose federal control in this sensitive, private area." Id. at 598 
(Sprouse, J., dissenting). Instead, Judge Sprouse stated that EMTALA should be ap­
plied on a case by case basis, not as a blanket requirement to treat. See id. at 599 
(Sprouse, J., dissenting). 
105. See Mary Crossley, Infants with Anencephaly, the ADA, and the Child Abuse 
Amendments, 11 ISSUES L. & MED. 379, 403-06 (1996). 
106. See In re Baby K, 832 F. Supp. 1022, 1030 (E.D. Va. 1993), affd, 16 F.3d 590 
(4th Cir. 1994). 
107. It is interesting to note that in the Baby K case, the mother and father dis­
agreed about the implementation of a DNR order. Citing Ms. H's religious beliefs in 
favor of life, the court decided that the mother's decision to continue rescusitations 
would prevail over the interests of the baby's father. See id. It should be noted that the 
United States Supreme Court expressed a limited bias in favor of choosing life in 
Cruzan v. Missouri Department of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 277-79 (1990) (deciding not to 
withdraw life support from an adult despite parental wish that it be withdrawn). 
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sions regarding the medical care of children. lOS The district court 
noted that "there [will be] a 'presumption that ... parents act in the 
best interests of [their] child' because the 'natural bonds of affec­
tion lead parents to act in the best interests of their children. "'109 
Therefore, the court appeared to be interested in protecting paren­
tal decisions as opposed to simply protecting any decision to con­
tinue a child's life. As such, a third party may have difficulty 
challenging a parental decision to cease treatment. 
C. The Obligation to Donate Organs 
Another issue that arises in the context of organ donation by 
anencephalic infants is whether there is an obligation to donate or­
gans. United States law, for the most part, imposes no obligation 
on any person to help or rescue another person in the absence of a 
clearly defined legal duty.110 This lack of an obligation contrasts 
with the duty to rescue found in European and other civil law coun­
tries.1ll In the United States, a strong man may watch a child 
drown, and as long as he has played no role in placing that child in 
danger, he will face no legal consequences, either civil or criminal, 
by failing to save the child.1l2 
108. See Baby K, 832 F. Supp. at 1030 (citing Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 603-04 
(1979) (dealing with parents' right to commit child to a mental institution». 
109. Id. at 1030 (quoting Parham, 442 U.S. at 602). 
110. See Jay Silver, The Duty to Rescue: A Reexamination and Proposal, 26 WM. 
& MARY L. REv. 423, 424 (1985). However, a few states have enacted "Duty to Res­
cue" laws. For example, Vermont has enacted a statute that reads as follows: 
(a) A person who knows that another is exposed to grave physical harm shall, 
to the extent that the same can be rendered without danger or peril to himself 
or without interference with important duties owed to others, give reasonable 
assistance to the exposed person unless that assistance or care is being pro­
vided by others. 
(c) A person who willfully violates subsection (a) of this section shall be fined 
not more than $100.00. 
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 519 (1973); see also MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604.05 (West 1988). 
111. The United States Constitution's emphasis on individual rights is what distin­
guishes the United States from many other nations. In countries using the Civil or 
Napoleonic law system, individuals are often charged with a duty to help others. For 
example, both Germany and the former Soviet Union impose a duty on citizens to 
rescue one another. See Ross A. Albert, Restitutionary Recovery for Rescuers, 74 CAL. 
L. REv. 85, 107, 109-10 (1986). 
112. See Handiboe v. McCarthy, 151 S.E.2d 905 (Ga. Ct. App. 1966) (finding no 
liability against a defendant who failed to rescue the plaintiff's four year old boy from a 
swimming pool); see also Osterlind v. Hill, 160 N.E. 301 (Mass. 1928) (holding in favor 
of a defendant who ignored loud cries for help from a man hanging onto an overturned 
canoe). 
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The harsh, individualistic concept embodied in the absence of a 
duty to rescue in the United States has been addressed by the 
courts in the context of medical rescue. In McFall v. Shrimp,l13 a 
man was dying of aplastic anemia and his only hope for survival was 
to receive a bone marrow transplant from his first cousin.114 How­
ever, the cousin refused to donate. The dying man appealed to a 
Pennsylvania court, seeking to force his cousin to donate by arguing 
that the process, while painful, would do the cousin no harm.115 
The court refused his request stating that "[o]ur society, contrary to 
many others, has as its first principle, the respect for the individual, 
and that society and government exist to protect the individual 
from being invaded and hurt by another. "116 
The protection from forcible donation after death is equally 
strong, if not so clearly rooted, in the law. The United States Court 
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, in Brotherton v. Cleveland,117 re­
cently recognized a wife's right to claim control of her husband's 
dead body. In Brotherton, the wife of a car accident victim was 
asked at the hospital if she would donate her husband's organs. She 
declined based on her husband's aversion to such a gift.118 None­
theless, when the coroner received the body for autopsy, he re­
moved the corneas and donated them to an eye bank.119 The wife 
brought a civil rights action claiming that her property, the body of 
her husband, had been taken by the state without due process.120 
The district cour~ dismissed the case stating that "Ohio does not 
give a surviving custodian a property interest in the body of a dece­
dent."121 The Sixth Circuit, however, allowed her claim,122 finding 
that the Ohio Uniform Anatomical Gift Act123 governs whether a 
relative has an interest in a dead body and "expressly grants a right 
to [the next of kin] to control the disposal of ... the body."124 The 
court held that the wife had an interest in control of the body, even 
though that interest was not necessarily characterized as a property 
113. 10 Pa. D. & C.3d 90 (1978). 
114. See id. at 90. 
115. See id. 
116. Id. at 91. 
117. 923 F.2d 477 (6th Cir. 1991). 
118. See id. at 478. 
119. See id. 
120. See id. at 478-79. 
121. Id. at 479. 
122. See id. 
123. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2108.01-.99 (Banks-Baldwin 1994). 
124. Brotherton, 923 F.2d at 482. ­
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right.125 Instead, the court held that the interest was a "legitimate 
claim of entitlement" protected by the due process clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.126 
A well-reported Chicago case again presented the issue of in­
voluntary donation. Curran v. Bosze127 involved a twelve year-old 
boy who was dying of leukemia and in need of a bone marrow 
transplant.128 No one in his immediate family was a compatible do­
nor; however, there were three and one-half year-old twins from a 
subsequent relationship of the boy's father who may have been 
compatible.129 The boy's father petitioned the court to force testing 
of the twins.13° The twins' mother, with whom the father shared 
custody, refused.131 After extensive proceedings, during which psy­
chiatrists, anesthesiologists, bone marrow donors, and parents of 
children who had donated bone marrow to siblings testified, the 
court upheld the mother's refusal.132 The court reasoned that 
although the testing and donation would not be unduly painful to 
the children, considering their mother's refusal, neither the testing 
nor the donation could be deemed to be within the twins' best inter­
ests.133 Therefore, the best interests of the prospective donors were 
given precedence over the best interest of the dying half-brother.134 
In another of the few reported cases on this issue, In re Rich­
ardson,135 parents in Louisiana sought to donate a kidney from 
their retarded seventeen year-old son to their thirty-two year-old 
125. See id. 
126. [d. 
127. 566 N.E.2d 1319 (III. 1990). 
128. See id. at 1321; see also Nancy Gibbs, The Gift of Life-or Else, TIME, Sep. 
10, 1990, at 70. 
129. See Curran, 566 N.E.2d at 1321. 
130. See id. at 1320-21. 
131. See id. at 1321. 
132. See id. at 1344-45. 
133. See id. at 1344. "Only where there is an existing relationship between a 
healthy child and his or her ill sister or brother maya psychological benefit to the child 
from donating bone marrow to a sibling realistically be found to exist." Id. 
134. The court wrote the following: 

No matter how small the hope that a bone marrow transplant will cure [the 

older boy] the fact remains that without the transplant [the older boy] will 
almost certainly die. The sympathy felt by this court, the circuit court, and all 
those who have learned of [the older boy's] tragic situation cannot, however, 
obscure the fact that, under the circumstances presented in the case at bar, it 
neither would be proper under existing law nor in the best interests of the 3 1/ 
2-year-old twins for the twins to participate in the bone marrow harvesting 
procedure. 
Id. at 1345. 
135. 284 So. 2d 185 (La. Ct. App. 1973). 
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daughter who was suffering from "an almost total loss of kidney 
function."136 The Louisiana Court of Appeals noted that although 
it had heard testimony from the boy, his retardation left him with 
the mental capacity of "a 3 or 4 year old child."137 Applying the 
"ultimate best interest of a minor" test, the court denied permission 
for the transplant, holding that since a minor was not allowed to 
donate property "it is inconceivable to us that [the law] affords less 
protection to a minor's right to be free in his person from bodily 
intrusion to the extent of loss of an organ unless such loss be in the 
best interest of the minor."138 
As a practical matter, donations between family members usu­
ally take place without legal intervention. Although sometimes 
hospital attorneys seek a declaratory judgment from the court 
before the procedure takes place, these opinions are often not re­
ported decisions.139 When both parents give their consent to an in­
tra-family donation, court intervention is rare. 
The extent to which intra-family donation is accepted as rou­
tine is highlighted by the Ayala scenario in which parents of a girl, 
Anissa, dying of chronic myelogenous leukemia conceived another 
child to serve as a bone marrow donor.140 Despite protests by 
136. Id. at 186. 
137. Id. 
138. Id. at 187. 
139. See Melvin Lewis, Kidney Donation by a 7-Year-Old Identical Twin Child, 13 
J. AM. ACAD. CHILD PSYCHIATRY 221, 229 (1974) (explaining that hospitals often seek 
declaratory judgments before acting, but that such orders are seldom reported). 
140. See David Grogan et aI., To Save Their Daughter from Leukemia, Abe and 
Mary Ayala Conceived a Plan-and a Baby, PEoPLE, Mar. 5, 1990, at 44; Anastasia 
Toufexis, Creating a Child to Save Another: A "Miracle Baby" Promises Both Blessings 
and Controversy, TIME, Mar. 5, 1990, at 56. Interestingly, the Ayalas were driven to this 
extreme measure because an anonymous perfect bone marrow match refused, at the 
last minute, to serve as a donor. See Grogan et aI., supra. Although, at that time, the 
anonymous donor was the only identifiable person who could save Anissa's life, there 
was no legal basis for compelling him to do so. See supra notes 110-12 and accompany­
ing text (explaining the lack of duty to rescue laws in the United States). 
The Ayala case takes on a new meaning in the context of the current issue of clon­
ing. In a case like the Ayalas', creating a clone of Anissa, their sick daughter, would 
have assured a compatible bone marrow donor. As future parents seek compatible 
bone marrow for their dying children, what will prevent them, when technology ad­
vances to the cloning of humans, from creating another baby with exactly the same 
genetic make-up? As societal opinion now stands, no authority can prevent adults from 
procreating. If the parents are willing to welcome and raise a new child, why would the 
fact that the new baby is guaranteed to save a sibling's life weigh against the 
conception? 
What if, however, the organ required was a heart rather than bone marrow? Par­
ents would not be allowed to use this new mentally intact child as an organ donor. This 
brief discussion of cloning in the context of the anencephalic serves to clarify the diffi­
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ethicists such as George Annas, who declared in Time magazine 
that "children aren't medicine for other people," there were no 
legal efforts to stop the Ayalas from conceiving the child or to pre­
vent the new baby from becoming a donor. l4l When the baby, 
Marissa, reached the age of fourteen months, her marrow was ex­
tracted and transplanted into Anissa.142 Five years later, Anissa 
was free of cancer.143 In an interview with CNN, Marissa explained 
"I saved her life. "144 
D. Parents' Right to Choose Donation 
An issue that clouds discussion of anencephalic organ donation 
is whether donation is the parents' choice. If the parents of an acci­
dent victim may choose to donate their child's organs, why can the 
parents of an anencephalic infant not do the same? The legal an­
swer is that there is a difference between a living child, which has 
the right to have its best interests protected by the state,145 and a 
dead child, which belongs to its parents alone.146 Parents do not 
own their living children, although they do have constitutional 
rights to make decisions for them.147 The parental right to make 
decisions for one's children stops short of actions which endanger 
the child in question.148 Just as a parent may not risk a child's life, 
the parent also should not have an unfettered right to use the child 
cult underlying issue: when is it acceptable to look at a baby as a source for organs 
rather than as a valuable person in its own right? Presumably, everyone would agree 
that it would not be permissible for parents to create a clone and then end the ensuing 
baby's life by taking an essential organ, regardless of another child's need for that or­
gan. This stems from the fundamental principle that one life should not be taken just to 
save another. 
141. Toufexis, supra note 140, at 56. 
142. See Claudia Glenn Dowling, Miraculous Babies, LIFE, Dec. 1993, at 75, 75. 
143. See Robert Jablon, Miracle Gift Lasts 5th Year; Baby Conceived to Give Own 
Sister Marrow Transplant, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, June 16, 1996, at 6A. 
144. (CNN television broadcast, June 9, 1996). 
145. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) ("[T]he family itseH is 
not beyond regulation in the public interest ... [a]nd neither rights of religion nor rights 
of parenthood are beyond limitation."). 
146. For example, Connecticut statutes provide that "the custody and control of 
the remains of deceased residents of this State shall belong to the ... next of kin." 
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45a-318 (1997). 
147. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982) (noting a historical recog­
nition of freedom of choice in family matters). 
148. See Custody of a Minor, 393 N.E.2d 836 (Mass. 1979) (requiring standard 
medical treatment despite parents' wishes to rely on vitamin therapy). But see In re 
Hofbauer, 393 N.E.2d 1009 (N.Y. 1979) (allowing parents to treat cancer with nutri­
tional therapy). 
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as an organ donor .149 
The debate over anencephalic organ donation takes place in 
the context of a fierce desire by some parents of dying children to 
have their children serve as organ donors. For example, a father of 
a seven year-old boy killed in an accident explained his feeling that 
knowing the boy's "organs live on in someone else is [like] an ex­
tension of his life that has made his death somewhat more beara­
ble. "150 Such sentiments are hardly discouraged by doctors and 
hospitals that perform transplants.151 In fact, parents often see or­
gan donation as a positive aspect of what would otherwise be un­
mitigated tragedy: the untimely death of a loved one. 
This desire on the part of parents has led to reported cases of 
organ donation by anencephalic infants. For instance, recently an 
anencephalic baby, Baby Gabriel, was delivered at term despite her 
parent's knowledge of her condition.152 Shortly after birth, she was 
pronounced dead and transferred to Lorna Linda University Medi­
cal Center in Los Angeles. When the doctors determined that Baby 
Gabriel had no chance of ever breathing on her own, she was re­
moved from a ventilator and her heart was successfully trans­
planted to a critically ill infant, Baby Paul, who had hypoplastic left 
heart syndrome.153 
Following the Baby Gabriel transplant, Lorna Linda suspended 
its program to harvest donor organs from anencephalic infants be­
cause of a lack of public consensus regarding when these infants can 
be deemed dead.154 Dr. Leonard Bailey, the infant heart surgeon at 
Lorna Linda, stressed that the program was only interested in 
anencephalic infants who could be declared brain dead. He ex­
149. See Prince, 321 U.S. at 170 (explaining that parents are free to martyr them­
selves, but that they are not free "to make martyrs of their children before they have 
reached the age of full and legal discretion"). 
150. Elisabeth Rosenthal, Parents Find Solace in Donating Organs, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 11, 1993, at C1. Voicing a similar perspective, a mother of a nineteen year-old 
killed in a riding accident said "I wanted some good to come out of it. It seemed mor­
ally wrong to bury those organs when somebody else could use them." Id. 
151. For example, Dr. Jonathan Slater, a child psychiatrist associated with the 
pediatric cardiac transplantation team at Columbia-Presbyterian Medical Center's Ba­
bies Hospital in New York, reports that "[djonating doesn't lessen [the parents'j pain, 
but it can give them a tremendous sense of continuity-that the loss has not been for 
naught-and that can be very helpful." Id. 
152. See Annas, supra note 16, at 36. 
153. See Brandon, supra note 30, at 782 (citing Sandra Blakeslee, Baby Without 
Brain Kept Alive to Give Heart, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 1987, at AI); see also Annas, supra 
note 16, at 36. 
154. See Shewmon et aI., supra note 16, at 1773. 
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plained, "I am not wacko; I am part of humanity. . .. I would not 
take the heart out of anybody who is still breathing and moving and 
kicking around."155 Baby Gabriel's mother reported afterward that 
she was "probably one of the proudest people around-to know 
another little human being is alive when you've lost your own child. 
It's like smiling through tears. "156 
A parent's legal rights, though, are highly fact specific. Parents 
clearly have the right to dispose of their child's body as they wish 
once there is a declaration of death.157 In practical terms, this 
means that the parents can donate, without restriction, the organs 
that can be harvested from a body after the termination of respira­
tion and heartbeat, including corneas and heart valves.158 The par­
ents can also offer the dead body of their child for medical 
research.159 The remaining and more difficult question 'concerns 
the donation of solid organs that must be retrieved while the body 
is still oxygenated. 
E. When May Organs Be Removed? 
Determining when organs may be removed is an important 
question because the removal before death, or at least preservation 
of certain organs, is medically necessary. The necessity arises be­
cause the process of dying involves deprivation of oxygen that, for 
the most part, renders the organs unusable.160 Thus, there is a spe­
cial sense of urgency when the patient is a potential organ donor. 
As one doctor explains, "to wait for [the anencephalic infant] to die 
in the traditional way-cardiorespiratory arrest-would render his 
organs useless."161 After traditional death, the organs would be 
155. Robert Steinbrook, Doctors Seek Means of Using Babies' Organs, L.A. 
TIMES, Nov. 12, 1987, Pt. 1, at 3. 
156. Chartrand, supra note 7. 
157. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45a-318 (1997) ("[T]he custody and control of 
the remains of deceased residents of this State belong to the ... next of kin."). 
158. See id. 
159. See id.; see also VNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 3, 8A V.L.A. 40 (1993) 
(defining who can make anatomical gifts of a decedent's body). 
160. ct. D.C. CODE ANN. § 2.1509.1 (Supp. 1998) (allowing techniques that pre­
serve organs to be employed by hospitals prior to actually obtaining consent to donate). 
The New York Times has reported the following: "In Illinois, under a protocol devel­
oped by the Regional Organ Bank of Illinois, ... [w]hen a person dies in an emergency 
room or is dead on arrival, doctors may infuse a cold preserving fluid into the cadaver's 
abdomen. Later, they will ask the family members for permission to take the organs." 
Gina Kolata, Organ Shortage Leads to Nontraditional Transplants, and Ethical Con­
cerns, N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 1993, at A15. 
161. Fost, supra note 12, at 333. 
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rendered useless because the natural suffocation that follows the 
cessation of breathing in im anencephalic infant whose heart stops 
beating makes harvesting the organs impossible. 
However, there is a rule, commonly known as the "dead do­
nor" rule, which states that a person must meet legal standards of 
death before donating organs. Under the dead donor rule, if the 
donor is still alive, his organs cannot be taken.162 Thus, the rule 
requires a diagnosis of brain death before organs can be donated. 
This, however, may render several organs of an anencephalic infant 
useless for purposes of organ donation. Therefore, several ap­
proaches for redefining the standard of death have been articulated; 
those approaches have been summarized by Dr. Norman Fost as 
follows: (1) waiting for cardio-respiratory death; (2) waiting a pre­
determined amount of time before declaring brain death; (3) rede­
fining brain death as cortical death; (4) creating a separate category 
of brain death, based on a diagnosis of anencephaly; or (5) aban­
doning the dead donor rule entirely and allowing donations of vital 
organs from living persons.163 The following subsections discuss the 
potential effectiveness of each of the proposed new standards of 
death. 
1. 	 Waiting for Death by Cardio-Respiratory Arrest 
The first approach to reconciling legal standards of death with 
anencephalic organ donation entails waiting for traditional death by 
cardio-respiratory arrest and allows for a very clear demarcation 
between life and death. However, after waiting for traditional 
death, the heart and liver will be unusable due to the loss of oxygen 
perfusion. l64 Therefore, waiting for traditional death will not in­
crease the number of organs available for donation. 
2. 	 Waiting a Predetermined Amount of Time Before 
Declaring Brain Death 
The second approach set forth by Dr. Fost for reconciling legal 
standards of death with anencephalic organ donation requires wait­
ing a predetermined amount of time for brain death.165 However, 
162. See id. at 332-33. The root of the dilemma rests on the words "still alive." If 
the issue were only the removal, or "harvesting" (the medical euphemism) of organs 
from a dead body then there would be few legal difficulties. The parents of an 
anencephalic infant could give such permission with no interference from the state. 
163. See id. at 333-36. 
164. See id. at 333. 
165. See id. 
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waiting this predetermined amount of time raises many practical 
problems. Leaving aside the special issues raised by anencephaly, 
the entire subject of declaring an infant brain dead by any medical 
standard is a complex one. As Dr. Carol Leicher, a pediatric neu­
rologist, explains, "no one has successfully devised a definition for 
declaring brain death for neonates."166 This lack of definition likely 
stems from the fact that infants may later develop brain functions 
that they do not have at birth,167 Based on this phenomenon, the 
Task Force for the Determination of Brain Death in Children has 
published standards that call for a waiting period of seven days af­
ter birth before declaring a newborn child to be brain dead.168 
For an anencephalic infant born with brain stem reflexes,169 the 
policy promulgated by the Task Force would require at least a seven 
day waiting period while the baby is observed for signs of brain 
activity. This waiting period creates burdensome practical issues in 
the neonatal intensive care unit. The parents may choose at any 
time to withdraw life support and allow the child to die if they be­
lieve that the burdens of treatment outweigh the benefits to the 
baby. If, however, the baby is a potential organ donor, it must be 
kept on life support equipment for a full seven days before it can be 
declared dead.170 
Presumably, the anencephalic infant would be maintained on a 
respirator and other life-support equipment for the full seven days. 
Yet, there is no guarantee, or even a great likelihood, that an 
166. Interview with Carol Leicher, M.D., Associate Professor of Pediatrics and 
Neurology, University of Connecticut School of Medicine, in Hartford, Conn. (June 30, 
1996). 
167. See Joseph J. Volpe, Brain Death Determination in the Newborn, 80 PEDIAT­
RICS 293, 294-95 (1987). 
168. See Task Force for the Determination of Brain Death in Children, Guide­
lines for the Determination of Brain Death in Children, 37 NEUROLOGY 1077, 1077-78 
(1987). 
169. There are at least 14 recognized signs of brain stem activity ranging from 
spontaneous respiration to a gag reflex. See Paul A. Byrne & Richard G. Nilges, The 
Brain Stem in Brain Death: A Critical Review, 9 ISSUES IN L. & MED. 3, 9-12 (1993). 
One test to determine brain death is a brain electrical activity, an EEG; however, in an 
anencephalic infant it is not useful because it measures higher brain activity, not brain 
stem activity. See id. at 14. 
170. See Task Force for the Determination of Brain Death in Children, supra 
note 168, at 1077-78. As one commentator notes, 
"only in the small minority of cases are questions concerning termination of 
life support or decisions to ternlinate such support made on the basis of a 
diagnosis of brain death. Indeed, most commonly, decisions concerning the 
termination of life support are formulated on the basis of the best interests of 
the devastatingly ill infant." 
Volpe, supra note 167, at 296-97. 
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anencephalic infant will be any closer to a legal standard of death 
after seven days.171 The infant may still have some brain stem func­
tions that prevent a declaration of death under the current, "whole 
brain death" standard. l72 Also, during the waiting period, the in­
fant would most likely have to be repeatedly resuscitated. 
Recognizing this problem, parents of anencephalic infants seek 
to have their children declared dead at or before birth so that or­
gans may be obtained. In a procedure that has become routine in 
harvesting organs from accident victims, a declaration of brain 
death allows the body to be supported by "life support" machinery 
that keeps the heart beating and lungs pumping.173 Thus, the or­
gans are kept viable until removed, at which point the machines are 
turned off.174 
3. Redefining Brain Death as Cortical Death 
The third approach to reconciling legal standards of death with 
anencephalic infant organ donation would require redefining brain 
171. Interview with Carol Leicher, M.D., Associate Professor of Pediatrics and 
Neurology, University of Connecticut School of Medicine, in Hartford, Conn. (June 30, 
1996). 
172. See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text for a discussion of the "whole 
brain death" standard. 
173. An article in the New York Times describes one family's experience as 
follows: 
After Mark Flanagan had been declared brain dead and his parents had con­
sented to donate his organs ... the Flanagans stayed with Mark, who was still 
on life support but officially dead, placing blankets on his body "to keep him 
warm and help preserve the organs." Five hours later recipients were waiting, 
and surgeons were poised to operate. "Those hours were a peaceful time with 
him," said Mrs. Flanagan. "But it was very difficult seeing him wheeled off, 
then the doors close, then that's it." 
Rosenthal, supra note 150. 
174. See Kolata, supra note 160. The University of Pittsburgh Medical Center has 
developed a protocol which begins 
when a person who is being kept alive on a respirator asks that the respirator 
be turned off and that his or her organs be removed for transplanting. The 
patient is [then] weaned from the respirator in an operating room, with sur­
geons standing by to remove the organs two minutes after the heart stops. 
Id. This practice has been criticized by Dr. Renee Fox, a University of Pennsylvania 
sociologist, who commented that 
she was appalled not only by "this almost desecrated death but also by the 
almost predatory degree to which we are trying to get organs." She also ques­
tions the idea of a timed death "in a freezing cold operating room, in the inte­
rior of a hospital, totally removed from friends and family and from anyone 
who had taken care of one." 
Id. 
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death as cortical death.175 This redefinition would designate 
anencephalic infants dead, even if born breathing, because they 
lack higher, cortical, brain function. 
The strongest argument against changing the definition of 
death from "whole brain death" to "cortical" death, which would 
result in an exception for anencephalic infants, is that this redefini­
tion could lead to further efforts at harvesting organs from people 
who are not now considered dead. Changing the law to make it 
easier to obtain organs from anencephalic infants could be the first 
step, however, down a slippery slope of obtaining organs from 
others in similar situations. This could include other people without 
consciousness, most notably those in a permanent vegetative state. 
In fact, the category could be expanded to include people who are 
conscious but have very short life expectancies, such as babies with 
fatal defects. Even more troublesome is the possibility of ex­
panding the definition to include those with consciousness and a 
normal life expectancy, but who will always be severely impaired 
and unable to take care of themselves; this might include the men­
tally or physically handicapped. The slippery slope implications of 
changing the definition of death buttress the fervent opposition to 
anencephalic organ donation by groups that oppose it, such as the 
National Right to Life Committee and commentators who are trou­
bled by the implication of the change.176 
Further, there is tangible evidence to support the concerns of 
the slippery slope. For instance, it is chilling to hear that surgeons 
in West Germany report removing the kidneys of an anencephalic 
infant before brain death without any legal ramificationsp7 In ad­
dition, Dr. Joyce Peabody, the chief of neonatology at Lorna Linda 
Hospital, reported that during the time Lorna Linda was seeking 
anencephalic infants as sources of organ transplants, she received a 
number of referrals from doctors of patients who did not have 
anencephaly.178 Instead, they had other impairments; for instance, 
175. See Fost, supra note 12, at 334-35 (focusing on loss of higher brain functions 
rather than all brain function as a standard of death). 
176. The National Right to Life Committee has expressed a strong opposition to 
anencephalic organ donation. They write that "[b]asing 'personhood' on cognitive abil­
ity-abhorrent enough when applied to anencephalic infants-will inevitably be ap­
plied to others." Leslie Bond & Dave Andrusko, Harvesting the Living, in A PASSION 
FOR JUSTICE: A PRo-LIFE REVIEW OF 1987 AND A LoOK AHEAD To 1988, at 83, 95 
(Dave Andrusko ed. 1988); see also J.e. Willkie & David Andrusko, Personhood 
Redux, HASTINGS CENTER REp., Oct.-Nov. 1988, at 30-33. 
177. See generally Holzgreve et aI., supra note 63. 
178. See Shewmon et aI., supra note 16, at 1775. 
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a neurologically intact baby born without kidneys. Describing these 
referrals, Dr. Peabody reported, "I have become educated by the 
experience.... The slippery slope is real."179 
4. 	 Creating a Separate Category of Brain Death Based on a 
Diagnosis of Anencephaly 
The fourth approach to reconciling legal standards of death 
with anencephalic infant organ donation would create a separate 
category of brain death for anencephalic infants.180 Thus, an infant 
diagnosed with anencephaly would be legally dead. This proposal 
puts great importance on diagnosis, since the diagnosis of 
anencephaly would be an automatic declaration of death. This is 
troublesome, as there are a range of neurological impairments that 
fall short of true anencephaly, and a declaration of death would 
depend on the diagnostic skills of the attending physician.181 
5. 	 Abandoning the Dead Donor Rule Entirely 
The final approach to reconciling legal standards of death with 
anencephalic infant organ donation imagines abandoning the dead 
donor rule altogether, thus permitting donation from anencephalic 
infants and persons in permanent vegetative states.182 However, 
some argue that loosening standards for organ procurement would 
cause a loss of public confidence in the entire organ donation 
process.183 
VI. ApPLICATION OF ETHICAL THEORY TO ORGAN DONATION 
BY ANENCEPHALIC INFANTS 
Ethical theory plays a significant role in the actions of a hospi­
tal team following a diagnosis of anencephaly. There is a well de­
veloped body of philosophy concerning the ethical obligations of 
health professionals.184 As Dr. Melvin Lewis concluded in an im­
portant discussion of a case involving organ donation between 
twins, "[i]n an absolute sense, no one can ever know what is ulti­
179. [d. (alteration in original). 
180. See Fost, supra note 12, at 334. 
181. See id. at 335. 
182. See id. 
183. See CEJA, supra note 68, at 1617. 
184. See TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDI. 
CAL ETHICS 7 (4th ed. 1994) ("Health care professions typically specify and enforce 
obligations, thereby seeking to ensure that persons who enter into relationships with 
their members will find them competent and trustworthy."). 
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mately the right choice: we simply cannot forecast the future."185 
Most likely, the ethical issues surrounding organ donation by 
anencephalic infants will have to be discussed by hospital ethics 
committees. The following sections highlight a number of ethical 
theories that may be relevant to such discussions. 
A. Bioethical Theory 
As described by Tom Beauchamp and James Childress in their 
leading book entitled Principles of Biomedical Ethics, "ethical the­
ory can illuminate problems in health care" by clarifying the rela­
tionship between what we do and what we think is the right thing to 
do,186 The issue of anencephalic organ donation can be analyzed 
according to Beauchamp and Childress' four cardinal principles of 
bioethical theory: autonomy, justice, non maleficence , and 
beneficence.187 
1. Autonomy 
Autonomy involves respecting a "person's right to hold views, 
to make choices, and to take actions based on personal values and 
beliefs."188 This stems from Immanuel Kant's argument that each 
person must have "the capacity to determine his or her own 
destiny."189 When the individual in question is not competent to 
make his or her own decisions, Beauchamp and Childress recognize 
a hierarchy of three standards for surrogate decision making.190 
These three standards are as follows: pure autonomy, substituted 
judgment, and decisions based on the patient's best interests.191 
Since pure autonomy is based on respecting a patient's previously 
expressed wishes, only the substituted judgment and best interests 
analyses are relevant in the case of an anencephalic infant who has 
never been conscious and could not have expressed any wishes. 
185. Lewis, supra note 139, at 235. Discussing the psychological issues raised by 
using a seven year-old girl as a kidney donor for her identical twin, Dr. Lewis came to 
the conclusion that in the case of this particular child, "[h]er cognitive and emotional 
development, including her reality testing, were such that she did not appear to be in 
danger of experiencing the operation as an overwhelming threat." Id. at 234. 
186. BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 184, at 3. 
187. See generally BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 184. 
188. Id. at 125. 
189. Id. 
190. See id. at 170-81. 
191. See id.; see also RUTH R. FADEN & TOM L. BEAUCHAMP, A HISTORY AND 
THEORY OF INFORMED CONSENT (1986) (providing greater depth into the analysis of 
autonomy). 
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The second standard, substituted judgment, requires the decision 
maker to "make the decision the incompetent would have made if 
competent."192 Since the substituted judgment standard also 
presumes some former level of decision-making ability, it "cannot 
meaningfully be applied in cases where the incompetent person was 
never (or has not yet been) capable of making judgments or expres­
sing wishes of his own."193 Accordingly, having ruled out the pure 
autonomy and substituted judgment standard, only the best inter­
ests standard remains. The best interests standard takes the deci­
sion away from the patient and gives the surrogate authority to 
make a decision in the best interests of the patient.194 The patient's 
best interests criteria is, therefore, the relevant model to look at 
when parents make decisions for their anencephalic child. 
Another question that arises when the patient is an infant is 
whose autonomy is being infringed, the infant's or the parent's? If 
the answer is the parent's autonomy, then allowing donation will 
satisfy the parent's right to choose on behalf of his or her child. The 
parent's right to choose becomes clouded when the parent's choice 
causes death.195 Still, parents are allowed to make choices for their 
severely ill infants, which result in the child's death. In cooperation 
with the doctors' medical judgment, a parent is allowed to decide 
that the burden of further treatment would not justify the benefit to 
the baby. Upon making this decision, the parent can direct that the 
child either be removed from life support equipment or not be re­
suscitated if he stops breathing.196 
However, if the infant's autonomy is to take precedence over 
the parent's autonomy, then many issues surface. Can an infant 
who has never had consciousness have the right to autonomy? Can 
his interests be separated from his parents? Does he have an inter­
192. BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 184, at 17l. 
193. Ruth Macklin, Return to the Best Interests of the Child, in WHO SPEAKS FOR 
TIlE CHILD: THE PROBLEMS OF PROXY CONSENT 265, 290 (Willard Gaylin & Ruth 
Macklin eds., 1982). 
194. See BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 184, at 178. 
195. If an anencephalic infant is not dead, then the process of donating organs 
will be the cause of death. Alexander Morgan Capron, writing on the problem of 
anencephalic organ donation, notes "an anencephalic neonate whose heart and lungs 
are functioning independently can not be considered brain dead. Indeed the baby 
lives." Alexander Morgan Capron, Anencephalic Donors: Separating the Dead from the 
Dying, HASTINGS CENTER REp., Feb. 1987, at 5, 5. 
196. Taking another view, Arthur Caplan argues that the status of brain death is 
clearest in the case of an anencephalic infant where there is no higher brain function. 
See Arthur L. Caplan, Should Foetuses or Infants Be Utilized as Organ Donors?, 1 
BIOETIlICS 119, 122 (1987). 
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est in dying through the natural cessation of whatever brain func­
tion he has left, rather than through the artificial process of organ 
donation? Might not an infant, if allowed to choose, prefer to die 
as a result of donating his organs? This question is less clear when 
we consider that this is not a choice available to any person, con­
scious or not. When a person has suffered the complete cessation 
of brain function, he is dead by all legal and medical standards. If 
that person then goes on to become an organ donor, it is an act that 
has occurred after his death and does not cause death itself. No one 
is allowed, either through advanced directives or through reliance 
on substituted judgment, to sacrifice his own life for the purpose of 
donating organs. If such a possibility were open, we might well im­
agine that people would choose this option in advance should they 
ever be in a permanent vegetative state. In fact, this option is not 
available. 
2. Justice 
Beauchamp and Childress describe justice as "distributive jus­
tice," which is the "fair, equitable, and appropriate distribution in 
society determined by justified norms that structure the terms of 
social cooperation."197 John Rawls, a leading contemporary philos­
opher of justice, views justice as fairness. 198 In determining 
whether justice is satisfied, we must ask if the result is fair. Are like 
cases being treated equally?199 Justice is particularly relevant in a 
discussion of anencephalic organ donation. From the neurologist's 
point of view, the perspective of justice raises the greatest barrier to 
anencephalic organ donation. According to pediatric neurologist 
Dr. Carol Leicher, an anencephalic infant with a functioning brain 
stem is in exactly the same situation as a person in a permanent 
vegetative state who retains brain stem reflexes.2oo Neither has sat­
isfied the requirements for whole brain death, which is the currently 
accepted legal and medical standard for a declaration of death.201 
197. BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 184, at 327. 
198. See id. at 340. 
199. This is sometimes viewed as a matter of equality; however, a recent article by 
Madison Powers challenges this Rawlsian perspective. See generally Madison Powers, 
Forget About Equality, 61 KENNEDY INST. EnlIcs J. 129 (1996). 
200. Interview with Carol Leicher, M.D., Associate Professor of Pediatrics and 
Neurology, University of Connecticut School of Medicine, in Hartford, Conn. (June 30, 
1996). 
201. See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text for a discussion of the "whole 
brain death" standard. 
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Is it, therefore, just to treat anencephalic infants differently from 
persons in permanent vegetative states? 
3. Nonmaleficence 
Nonmaleficence is the obligation of the medical profession not 
to harm its patients.202 The health professional's primary obligation 
is to do no harm.203 Beauchamp and Childress explain that the ob­
ligation to do no harm supersedes any possible collateral good re­
sult of the harm.204 Nonmaleficence would seem, then, to forbid 
both withdrawing and withholding treatment and the taking of or­
gans from a living person, regardless of the shortness of that per­
son's life span or the good the organs will do. 
In the case of an anencephalic infant who retains brain stem 
function, removal of organs would directly cause the infant's death. 
Thus, harm would be done to the infant. Nonmaleficence, however, 
does not mean that every measure must be taken to prolong a pa­
tient's life, regardless of the consequences. Providing life sustaining 
care might harm a patient who has no prospect of surviving his sick­
ness. Beauchamp and Childress point out that, in some cases, ef­
forts made to preserve life actually cause suffering.205 How can a 
standard based on pain and suffering be applied to an anencephalic 
infant who presumably lacks the mental function to feel pain or to 
suffer? One answer, addressing the core of the most troubling is­
sues regarding anencephalic infants, is that, as humans, 
anencephalic infants are entitled to the respect owed to all human 
life forms. The question can then be asked whether treatment is 
interfering with whatever quality of life the baby might experience, 
for example, being held by her parents as she dies. 
4. Beneficence 
Beneficence addresses the moral obligation in a health care 
setting to contribute to the patient's welfare.206 Many would argue 
that organ donation is the ultimate expression of beneficence. 
However, beneficence does not sanction doing harm to one person 
for another's good.207 For an act to be beneficent, it must also ben­
efit, or at least have neutral consequences, for the patient. Harvest­
202. See BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 184, at 189. 
203. See id. 
204. See id. at 19l. 
205. See id. at 233. 
206. See id. at 259. 
207. See id. at 266. 
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ing the organs of a patient not yet brain dead would not satisfy the 
requirements of beneficence. 
Indeed, analyzing any individual's duty of beneficence to an­
other, a precondition of any obligation is the principle that the "ac­
tion would not present significant risks, costs, or burdens" to the 
giver.208 In the case of organ donation before complete cessation of 
brain function, the consequence to the patient/donor is death. Be­
neficence has never been used to justify a situation in which one 
person dies for the benefit of another. While no one can stop a 
person from giving his life for another in an emergency, in a medi­
cal setting, such beneficence would not be permitted. Parents 
could not, for example, donate their own heart to their child in need 
of a transplant. 
A definitive change in law or public policy that accepts a less 
than "whoie brain death" standard would likely affect both the be­
neficence and nonmaleficence principles. For example, there are 
viewpoints that receiving a blood transfusion is doing an extreme 
harm. lehovahs Witnesses, for example, believe that receiving a 
blood transfusion makes it impossible for them or their families to 
enter heaven.209 Equally, there are those who believe that removal 
of organs, even after death, causes harm. At the same time, these 
are not universally held beliefs. These beliefs are reflected in cur­
rent law by making receipt of medical treatment and donation of 
organs voluntary. Those who do not want to receive a blood trans­
fusion or be an organ donor are not required to do so. Yet, there is 
no such option in the case of the "whole brain death" standard. 
One cannot opt in or out of "whole brain death." It is questionable 
whether the analogy to blood transfusions really holds. In the strict 
sense, people are not declared brain dead according to their beliefs. 
Less formally, however, a declaration of brain death is only made 
when the patient is a potential organ donor. If, for religious or 
other personal reasons, a patient does not wish to be an organ do­
nor, it is unlikely that the medical staff will take the step of declar­
ing him brain dead. 
B. The Virtues 
Another ethical theory which may shape the decisions of ethics 
208. Id. 
209. See James E. Dougherty, Coronary Stent Placement as a Bridge to Coronary 
Artery Byp"ass Surgery in an Unstable, Anemic Jehovah's Witness Patient: A Case Report 
and Review of Bloodless Surgery Techniques, 61 CONN. MED. 195, 197 (1997). 
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committees confronted with an anencephalic infant organ donation 
scenario is that of "virtues." The theory of "virtues" developed 
from Aristotle's principle of "arete," by which he meant the highest 
form of doing an action. For Aristotle, virtue constituted not just 
the act performed, but the state of mind of the person doing it. This 
theory of virtue was expanded by St. Augustine, who identified the 
cardinal virtues of prudence, courage, temperance, and justice. The 
concept of the state of mind of the actor, his virtue, in regards to 
medical decision making, was carried further by the major modern 
proponents of this theory, Edmund Pellegrino and David Thom­
asma in their book entitled The Virtues in Medical Practice.210 
Explaining the need for consideration of the virtues in medical 
decision making, Pellegrino and Thomasma write that principlism, 
the consideration of autonomy, justice, beneficence, and 
nonmaleficence, "fails to take into sufficient account of the charac­
ter of the agent, as well as the nuances of real life that situate and 
define the moral quandary."211 For Pellegrino and Thomasma, it is 
not enough that the medical professional makes the right decision, 
but whether the decision is made for the right reason. For example, 
a physician may respect a patient's wishes when they are in concert 
with his own, but not when the physician disagrees with the patient. 
Disrespect by a physician of a patient's wishes, simply because he 
disagrees with the wishes, does not provide genuine respect for au­
tonomy because the practitioner does not respect the patient as an 
individual.212 For many people, the idea of causing an infant's 
death, either by not resuscitating her or by removing her organs in 
order to save another infant, is the sort of "wartime triage" that a 
doctor of good c,haracter should guard against. However, Pelle­
grino and Thomasma recognize that there are some situations in 
which there is no common idea of good.213 In those cases, "[a] 
moral decision is not a decision about a principle, but about the 
210. EDMUND D. PELLEGRINO & DAVID C. THOMASMA, THE VIRTUES IN MEDI­
CAL PRACTICE (1993). For another discussion of virtues, see ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, 
AfTER VIRTUE (2d ed. 1984). 
211. PELLEGRINO & THOMASMA, supra note 210, at 101. 
212. Pellegrino and Thomasma stress that attention to ethics and principles does 
not guarantee a good result. For example, in writing about the abuses by doctors during 
the holocaust they note that "the lessons to be learned from this experience are that all 
individuals must be treated as ends in themselves, that the evils of wartime triage 
should not become ordinary or accepted ethical practice." Id. at 15. They further write 
that "only critically reflective medical ethics and self-critical individuals-of good charac­
ter can offer some hope that history will not be repeated here." Id. 
213. See id. at 18. 
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relationship of circumstances, intentions, and ends toa princi­
ple."214 Thus, a virtuous physician does not only "what is required 
as duty but seek[s] the perfection-the excellence, the arete of a 
particular virtue. "215 The virtuous person is therefore impelled by 
his virtues to strive for perfection.216 Striving for perfection con­
trasts with settling for an adequate or acceptable result. 
Using virtues such as justice and courage, an individual medical 
practitioner must consult his own conscience when deciding 
whether to prolong an anencephalic infant's life.217 Regarding 
anencephalic organ donation, a virtues based analysis would con­
clude that the life of an anencephalic infant should have no less 
value than the life of a healthy infant either because the infant lacks 
consciousness or because of the great good that the anencephalic's 
organs can do for another infant. The physician should seek moral 
excellence in the care of his patient; he should not seek to achieve 
the best result for society. 
C. Consequentialism 
As a moral theory, the ethics of the virtues analysis stands op­
posed to a consequentialist perspective which calls for performing 
the act that will do the most good over all.218 A consequentialist 
looks to the benefit to society, perhaps in the form of making re­
sources available to others through the withholding of treatment 
from an anencephalic infant. The question asked by the consequen­
tialist is whether an anencephalic's organs would help an otherwise 
healthy baby who will die without an organ transplant. In other 
words, the actual morality of an act, in this case ending the life of a 
baby, can, under a consequentialist view, be weighed against the 
good that act will create. Few members of hospital ethics commit­
tees are strict consequentialists. However, it is important for this 
theory to be recognized so that everyone involved can fully under­
stand the implications of acting or not acting. 
214. Id. at 23. 
215. Id. at 166. 
216. See id. 
217. For Pellegrino and Thomasma, this would result in a decision not to sacrifice 
the life of an anencephalic infant even for the purpose of saving other children. Quot­
ing Joseph Cardinal Bernardin's address on euthanasia at the University of Chicago 
Hospital they write "[w]e cannot accept a policy that would open the door to euthanasia 
by creating categories of patients whose lives can be considered of no value merely 
because they are not conscious." Id. at 122. 
218. See generally SHELLY KAGAN, THE LIMITS OF MORALITY (1989). 
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D. Communitarian Bioethics 
Communitarian bioethics, another popular theory, is centered 
on the patient's own values. Therefore, communitarian bioethics is 
difficult to apply in the case of an unconscious patient. As ex­
plained by Drs. Eziekial and Linda Emanuel, the ideal relationship 
for a patient and physician is a deliberative model in which the doc­
tor acts as a teacher and a friend to the patient.219 In contrast to a 
paternalistic model, in which the doctor does what he thinks is best, 
and an informative model, in which the doctor merely provides in­
formation, in the deliberative model the physician helps the patient 
identify "the best health related values that can be realized in the 
clinical situation."22o In a deliberative model, the patient's own val­
ues are open to discussion in a manner that promotes self-under­
standing relevant to medical care.221 
Yet, how can an anencephalic infant's physician work in a de­
liberative model? The patient is not only unconscious, but has 
never been conscious. As with the other theories, the doctor pursu­
ing a deliberative model must work with the infant's parents, who 
are the infant's representatives. The physician cannot, however, 
forget that the infant is his patient, not the parents. It may be ac­
ceptable to the physician to abide by the parents' decision to with­
draw or withhold life support if the burdens of treatment to the 
patient outweigh the potential benefits. Such an agreement would 
not necessarily include taking organs from a breathing, though un­
conscious patient, regardless of the potential good this act would do 
for others. 
E. 	 A Philosopher's Analysis of Anencephalic Organ Donation: 
Hans Jonas 
In the event that there is time for a full exploration of ethical 
issues, the ethics committee would benefit from reading two impor­
tant essays by the philosopher Hans Jonas. These essays explore 
issues of declaring brain death for the purpose of organ donation. 
There are two Jonas essays that are relevant to anencephalic 
organ donation: Philosophical Reflections on Experimenting with 
Humqn Subjects and Against the Stream: Comments on the Defini­
219. See Ezekiel J. Emanuel & Linda L. Emanuel, Four Models of the Physician
Patient Relationship, 267 JAMA 2221, 2222 (1992). 
220. 	 Id. 
221. 	 See id. at 2222, 2225-26. 
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tion and Redefinition ofDeath.222 In these two essays, Jonas consid­
ered, not anencephalic neonates in particular, but subjects of 
human experimentation and brain dead organ donors. These two 
subjects raised issues highly relevant to anencephalic organ dona­
tion: the pronouncement of death and the exploitation of the 
powerless. 
Writing Philosophical Reflections at the time of the Harvard 
Ad Hoc Committee's report on the recognition of brain death,223 
Jonas had no disagreement with the idea that a person whose heart 
and lungs were being maintained by machines might still be dead 
because of lack of brain activity.224 Jonas objected, however, to de­
claring brain death for the purpose of converting the patient into an 
organ donor. The doctors in this process want not permission "to 
turn off the respirator, but, on the contrary, to keep it on and 
thereby maintain the body in a state of what would have been 'life' 
by the older definition (but is only a 'simulacrum' of life by the 
new)-so as to get at his organs and tissues under the ideal condi­
tions of what would previously have been 'vivisection."'225 Jonas 
further argued that "[s]ince we do not know the exact border line 
between life and death, nothing less than the maximum definition 
of death will do-brain death plus heart death plus any other indi­
cation that may be pertinent-before final violence is allowed to be 
done."226 
Addressing the issue a year later in Against the Stream, Jonas 
reaffirmed his distrust of the Harvard Committee's motives because 
of their bias toward obtaining organs for transplantation. Jonas 
supported his position by quoting the author of the committee's re­
port, Dr. Henry K. Beecher, who asked '''[clan society afford to 
discard the tissues and organs of the hopelessly unconscious patient 
when they could be used to restore the otherwise hopelessly ill, but 
still salvageable individual?"'227 Jonas replied, this "intrusion into 
the theoretical attempt to define death makes the attempt 
impure."228 
Given Jonas' definitive views on the inability to know where 
222. HANS JONAS, PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS: FROM ANCIENT CREED TO TECHNO­
LOGICAL MAN 105-40 (1974). 
223. Ad Hoc Committee of the Harvard Medical School to Examine the Defini­
tion of Brain Death, A Definition of Irreversible Coma, 205 JAMA 337 (1968). 
224. See JONAS, supra note 222, at 129-30. 
225. Id. at 129. 
226. Id. at 130 (emphasis omitted). 
227. Id. at 133. 
228. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
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the line is between life and death, he probably would have, had he 
considered the issue, opposed both the AMA and the legal propo­
sal for harvesting organs from an anencephalic infant. Indeed, an 
anencephalic infant is the prototype of Jonas' unconscious, but not 
yet dead person. In responding to critics who described brain dead 
organ donors as vegetables, Jonas wrote "as if 'vegetable' were not 
an instance of life!"229 This echoes a recent comment by a leading 
ethicist that an anencephalic neonate is at the same brain level of a 
fish and therefore is an appropriate source of organs.230 Many 
would question whether a human baby, regardless of her medical 
condition, could be compared with a fish. Jonas would not find the 
comparison useful. Instead, he would ask whether we have trouble 
distinguishing a dead fish from a live one? If the fish is alive, do we 
not understand that by depriving it of oxygen we are killing it? A 
baby, even one with no higher brain function, is either alive or 
dead. 
Some of Jonas' arguments may seem to favor anencephalic or­
gan donation over other brain dead organ donors because the 
anencephalic has never been a living, feeling person. He writes that 
as long as the body "breathes [or] pulses ... [it] must still be consid­
ered a residual continuance of the subject that loved and was loved, 
and as such is still entitled to some of the sacrosanctity accorded to 
such a subject by the laws of God and men."231 Although the 
anencephalic never "loved," he "was loved" by his family. Does his 
lack of ability to feel emotion automatically make him a potential 
organ donor? Yet, Jonas' strong position against capitalizing on an 
unconscious being, regardless of the reason for his unconsciousness, 
weighs toward his opposing the use of anencephalic infants as organ 
donors. 
Jonas argues persuasively that the greatest sacrifices should not 
be exacted from the most vulnerable. Writing on the use of human 
subjects in scientific experiments, Jonas stated "the poorer in 
knowledge, motivation, and freedom of decision (and that, alas, 
means the more readily available in terms of numbers and possible 
manipulation), the more sparingly and indeed reluctantly should 
the reservoir be used, and the more compelling must therefore be­
come the countervailing justification."232 The shortage of donor 
229. Id. at 135. 
230. See Chartrand, supra note 7. 
231. JONAS, supra note 222, at 139. 
232. Id. at 123. 
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organs would not, to Jonas, be a "countervailing justification." 
Harvesting organs from the unconscious patient is "simply and un­
qualifiedly impermissible; progress or not, he must never be used 
on the inflexible principle that utter helplessness demands utter 
protection."233 
Jonas' clear repudiation of using unconscious persons as organ 
donors places him outside the mainstream of today's medical prac­
tices. Patients without brain activity who are not breathing on their 
own are often declared dead for the purposes of organ donation. A 
new refinement to this technique developed by the Pittsburgh Med­
ical Center calls for withdrawing life-support, waiting two minutes, 
and then harvesting organs from the newly dead patient.234 Jonas 
would argue that both techniques unjustifiably interfere with the 
dying process and thus risk obtaining organs from living persons. 
Jonas' work evidences his awareness of where this practice 
could lead. One instance concerns the slippery slope effect of using 
brain dead individuals as organ donors. Ironically, he writes of al­
ternative uses for the breathing body that would be the corpse: 
"[l]et us not forget research. Why shouldn't the most wonderful 
surgical and grafting experiments be conducted on the complaisant 
subject-nonsubject ... ? What a boon for medical instruction, for 
anatomical and physiological demonstration and practicing on so 
much better material than the inert cadavers otherwise serving in 
the dissection room!"235 
Jonas' fears have become reality. In a recent article by a medi­
cal student present at the removal of organs from a young boy de­
clared brain dead, the author writes that after the organs were 
removed "all that was left on the table was a carcass of a boy. My 
chief resident provided ... me with one of the best anatomy lessons 
[I] had ever had. We saw muscles, nerves, and other structures that 
we had never found in our cadavers in anatomy class. "236 
Hans Jonas would approve of the AMA's reversal of its deci­
sion to use "living" anencephalic neonates as organ donors. His 
fears regarding the eventual result of an increasing practice of de­
claring terminally ill patients "brain dead" for the purposes of or­
gan donation have come true. We have, to a large extent, become 
233. Id. at 126. 
234. See supra note 174 and accompanying text for a discussion of this practice. 
235. JONAS, supra note 222, at 137. 
236. Julie Rothstein, Attending to Transitions: A Medical Student's Encounter with 
Transplantation, MAKING THE ROUNDS IN HEALTH, FAITH, & ETIucs, Oct. 23, 1995, at 
1,5. 
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complacent with the process, enough so that many are willing to 
view a breathing, pulsing newborn infant as an appropriate organ 
donor. 
VII. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Viewed in light of current legal, public health, medical, social, 
and ethical norms, the anencephalic infant is viewed as having a 
catastrophic birth defect not compatible with life. Anencephalic in­
fants are not suitable candidates for organ donation because they 
do not meet current legal or medical standards of brain death.237 
Efforts to blur the distinction between life and death, by consider­
ing the relative value of an anencephalic infant's quality of life, are 
troubling. As the discussion of the slippery slope shows, it is a short 
distance between deciding that an anencephalic baby has no life 
worth living as compared to a person in a permanent vegetative 
state who lacks upper brain function.238 The danger surrounding 
anencephalic infants is that the prospect of donation is especially 
attractive because the ending of one life can have the direct result 
of preserving another life. Furthermore, the need to find meaning 
in the life of anencephalic babies makes organ donation by 
anencephalic infants a bitterly difficult problem. 
Given the continued shortage of donor hearts,239 the issue of 
making more organs available continues to be pressing. Whether 
anencephalic infants can be a source of these organs remains a 
highly controversial legal, public health, medical, social, and ethical 
issue. Society as a whole should determine whether anencephalic 
infants are to be used as organ donors. As such, the issue requires 
more public understanding of the factors that lead some to see 
anencephalic infants as dead. More than a technicality or a legal 
obfuscation, the barriers to anencephalic organ donation are based 
on what we as a society are willing to call life and death. 
Nevertheless, ethics committees and hospital counsel must con­
tinue to deny the wishes of parents who want their anencephalic 
infants to be organ donors, not based solely on a current interpreta­
tion of the law, but because our society believes it is important, as 
Capron said in 1987, to "separate the dead from the dying."24o 
Given the competing interests inherent in anencephalic organ 
237. See Fost, supra note 12; at 333; see also supra Part IV.E. 
238. See supra note 80 and accompanying text. 
239. See Kinkopf-Zajac, supra note 26, at 521-23. 
240. Capron, supra note 195, at 5. 
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donation, what should an ethics committee do? The best resolution 
of the issue starts with a clear understanding by the ethics commit­
tee itself, and the attending medical personnel, of what constitutes 
anencephaly and what surrounds anencephalic organ donation. 
The first hurdle is brain stem function. It is too easy to think of 
anencephalic infants as being "without" a brain and therefore not 
fully human. In fact, society is far from a definition of what being 
"fully human" entails and, until such a consensus is reached, we are 
left with the law as it now stands. The law in the United States 
recognizes only two states of being, alive and dead.241 Death is de­
fined in various ways, but in essence involves the complete absence 
of brain function.242 While respiration and heart beat can be sus­
tained by machines and drugs, making them less reliable indicators 
of life, there is currently no way to support brain activity. 
A person who is dead, who has no brain function, may be a 
source for organ donation.243 That person must be declared dead 
by competent medical authorities based on the legal definition of 
death in the state. Thus, while the biomechanics of life can be sus­
tained artificially until the actual moment when the organs are re­
moved, the individual is dead at the time that death is declared. 
Death does not occur at organ removal. 
At least for the time being, the law's answer to anencephalic 
organ donation is the correct one as well. Until much more is 
known about brain function, it seems unduly careless to extend the 
definition of death to include individuals with at least some brain 
function as dead. This is true for both the person in a permanent 
vegetative state as well as for the anencephalic. Whether the per­
son never has, or never again will have, higher brain function does 
not speak to his condition at the moment. What is he now? Is he 
alive? The root issue with anencephalics and persons in persistent 
vegetative states may be that it is a judgment of lack of potential. 
This is a slippery slope that we should be very careful of sliding 
down as it has no natural hand-holds. 
That the distinction between total brain death and near total 
brain death seems a fine one is not a reason for rejecting the dis­
tinction. The anencephalic organ donation programs that led to a 
variety of infants who were far short of anencephalic being pro­
posed for organ donation evidences our general uncomfortableness 
241. See supra Part V. 
242. See supra Part V. 
243. See supra Part V.E. 
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with this topic.244 It is important to remember that this decision is 
being made under the pressure of a shortage of donor organs.245 
This same pressure likely caused the adoption of our current stan­
dards of brain death. If there were no need for organs, there would 
be no need to declare brain death. Instead, families could decide to 
withhold or withdraw treatment without influence of what is 
needed for the greater good. We are prepared to reason backwards 
when it comes to finding sources for donor organs because society 
sees organ donation as a good thing. 
Writing this, I appreciate that nothing will convince parents 
like the Ms who have experienced the death of their baby without 
any possibility of mitigation through organ donation. To them I 
would say, the best resolution for an individual family is not the 
best resolution for society as a whole. If anencephalies may be or­
gan donors, then why not persons in permanent vegetative states or 
persons with subnormal intelligence? Much of the tragedy of the 
Ms' decision was the lack of consistent information.246 If there is a 
well thought-out, clearly expressed position on anencephalic organ 
donation developed before the situation arises then parents of 
anencephalies will not be given false hopes or unrealistic expecta­
tions. An anencephalic infant's short life may be given meaning 
through methods short of organ donation. For instance, after they 
die, anencephalic infants can be used for research purposes in order 
to increase medical science's knowledge of the condition. Corneas 
and heart-valves, which remain useable after death,247 can be 
donated without restriction. Solely because a baby will die without 
ever having attained consciousness does not mean that the child is 
not, nor ever has been alive. Legal standards for organ donation 
have been set in the United States, and until there is a consensus 
that these standards should be changed, anencephalic infants can­
not and should not be used as sources for donor organs. 
EPILOGUE: THE Ms 
Speaking with the Ms eight months after the triplets' birth, it is 
obvious that they still feel anger and frustration at the events sur­
rounding their attempts to donate baby Avery's organs. The Ms 
244. See supra notes 178-79 and accompanying text (discussing proposals of dona­
tion by those with conditions other than anencephaly). 
245. See supra Part II for a general discussion of the shortage of donor organs. 
246. For a discussion of the Ms' experience, see the Prologue to this Article. 
247. See Lafreniere & McGrath, supra note 14, at 445. 
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were very. willing to talk about that time, and about their feelings 
then and now. Mr. M said talking about Baby Avery made him feel 
better. Mrs. M mourns both Baby Avery and her mother. She feels 
that Baby Avery is now with her mother and that her mother is 
taking care of her baby. Baby Avery is very much a presence in the 
Ms' home. They report having pictures of Baby Avery throughout 
their house. The Ms plan to tell the two surviving triplets the story 
of Baby Avery, including, when the triplets are older, the organ do­
nation that never happened. At the one-year anniversary of Baby 
Avery's death, the Ms and their children released balloons into the 
sky for Baby Avery and for themselves. The children's balloons, 
reported Mrs. M, "all veered off to the left. Baby Avery's balloon," 
a big pink one, "went straight up to the sky." 
